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In this dissertation, I examine the impact of earnings management and expectations 
management on the usefulness of earnings and analyst forecasts in firm valuation. 
Earnings and analyst forecasts are important inputs into accounting valuation models. 
Their ability to reflect current and predict future firm performance can help valuation 
models predict intrinsic value. However, increasing earnings management and 
expectations management activities in recent years m y have adversely affected the 
usefulness of these information items in firm valuation. This study shows that intrinsic 
value metrics estimated using manipulated earnings or forecasts have less ability to track 
stock prices and predict future returns through V/Pratios, providing evidence for the joint 
hypothesis of (i) long-term market efficiency and (ii) the negative impact of earnings 
management and expectations management on the usefulness of earnings and analyst 
forecasts in firm valuation. It contributes to the accounting literature in several ways. 
First, it challenges the conventional view that more accurate and less biased forecasts are 
necessarily of better quality and proposes to assess th  quality of analyst forecasts 
directly by examining their usefulness. It also introduces an improved measure for 
expectations management and presents new evidence on (i) the usefulness of earnings 
and analyst forecasts in firm valuation; (ii) the negative impacts of earnings management 
and expectations management on this usefulness; and (iii) the overall performance of 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Motivation  
In this dissertation, I investigate the impact of earnings management and 
expectations management on the usefulness of earnings and analyst forecasts in firm 
valuation. This inquiry is motivated by several important prior studies. Notably, Skinner 
and Sloan (2002) demonstrate that stock market investors severely punish firms that fail 
to meet earnings expectations; while Bowen et al. (1995) and Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997) find that firms that meet earnings benchmarks enhance their reputations with 
stakeholders such as customers, suppliers, and creditors, and hence enjoy better terms of 
trade. In addition, Healy (1985) argues that managers exercise accounting discretion to 
maximize the present value of their bonus compensation. In a related study, Matsunaga 
and Park (2001) find that failure to meet analyst forecasts results in pay cuts for CEOs. 
Taken together, the results from prior research suggest that factors such as stock market 
pressure, reputation effect, and private benefits for management all motivate firms to 
manipulate earnings and analyst earnings expectations o meet or beat expectations 
(MBE). Consistent with this view, recent studies such as Bartov et al. (2002) provide 
empirical evidence that firms manage both earnings and analyst expectations in order to 
report earnings that meet or exceed analyst expectations. In addition, Matsumoto (2002) 
provides evidence suggesting that firms have recently increased manipulation of both 




To the best of my knowledge, a great deal of empirical research has been conducted 
to demonstrate the existence and assess the extent of arnings and expectations 
management, but little has been done to date to focus investigation on the implications 
and consequences of such manipulation. In reaction to increasing management 
manipulation and accounting scandals, the SEC has expressed the concern that the 
pressure to meet earnings expectations is eroding the quality of financial reporting. In 
response to this concern, I examine the impact of expectations management and earnings 
management on the usefulness of analyst forecasts and earnings in firm valuation. 
 
1.2 Expectations Management and the Usefulness of Forecasts in Firm Valuation 
Research in analyst forecasts, such as Fried and Givoly (1982) and Brown (1997), 
assesses forecast quality in terms of relative accur y and bias. In the same vein, Ciccone 
(2003) reports that forecast dispersion and error have decreased consistently from 1990 to 
2001. He attributes this trend to analysts’ improved forecast abilities. However, this 
conclusion is subject to an important qualification: if the apparent improvement in analyst 
forecasts (in terms of higher accuracy and reduced bias) is an artefact of management’s 
intentional expectations management activities for the purpose of meeting or beating 
expectations (MBE), then these manipulated forecasts will less accurately represent 
market expectations and will fail to predict future t ue economic performance. Thus, 
while the forecasts may appear more accurate and less biased, they may actually be of 
lower quality. As stressed by O’Brien (1988), although the properties of analyst forecasts, 




assessment of forecast quality should depend on the cont xt within which the forecasts 
are being used.  
In accounting research, analyst forecasts are used as critical inputs to accounting 
valuation models. Prior studies such as Dechow et al. (1999) and Frankel and Lee (1998) 
find that using analyst forecasts rather than forecasts based on past earnings improves the 
ability of these models to predict firm value. However, in the presence of ever-increasing 
expectations management activities, it is important o determine whether analyst forecasts 
are still useful in firm valuation.  To assess this, I compare the abilities of valuation 
models estimated using manipulated and non-manipulated forecasts to predict firm value 
in Chapter 2  
I first build on prior studies to develop an improved measure of expectations 
management. I then follow prior studies, in particular Lee et al., (1999) and Dechow et 
al. (1999), to examine how well valuation models predict firm value by examining the 
ability of the intrinsic value metrics to track stock prices and predict future returns 
through the intrinsic value-to-price (V/P) ratios. If expectations management impairs the 
usefulness of analyst forecasts in firm valuation and reduces the ability of intrinsic value 
metrics to predict firm value then, under the market efficiency paradigm, I should 
observe that intrinsic value metrics estimated using manipulated forecasts have less 
ability to track stock price and predict future returns than intrinsic value metrics 
estimated using non-manipulated forecasts. 
My empirical findings suggest that intrinsic value m trics estimated using 
manipulated forecasts (i) experience a greater decline in correlations with stock price 




deviations and auto-correlations, and (iii) have less ability to identify mispriced stocks 
and predict future returns through V/P ratios. These results provide consistent evidence 
for the joint hypotheses that (1) expectations management impairs the usefulness of 
analyst forecasts in accounting valuation models and reduces the ability of intrinsic value 
metrics to predict firm value, and (2) the market is long-term efficient – it identifies and 
appropriately discounts for such manipulation over th  course of a few months; 
consequently, in light of expectations management, stock price represents a more 
accurate measure of firm value.. 
 
1.3. Earnings Management and the Usefulness of Earnings in Firm Valuation 
Earnings are often used in firm valuation by both the stock market and accounting 
valuation models. In particular, earnings are useful because they can capture truthful 
information relevant in assessing and predicting firm performance (Cheng, 2005). 
However, firms’ deliberate earnings management activities may introduce errors into 
earnings and thereby reduce their ability to convey truthful information (Bernard, 1995). 
Whether or not the stock market or accounting valuation models can accurately predict 
firm values in the presence of earnings management is an empirical question. In Chapter 
3, I investigate this issue to provide empirical evid nce on the impact of earnings 
management on the usefulness of earnings in firm valuation.  
As a first step of the inquiry I combine the aggregat  accrual approach and the 
distribution of earnings after management approach to develop a more specific measure 
for earnings management. I then use the Ohlson (1995) residual income valuation model 




In the empirical analysis, I first compare the intrinsic value estimates (V) and the 
stock prices (P) for manipulators and non-manipulators o assess whether the market 
recognizes earnings management and discounts the stock prices for the firms that 
manipulate earnings. My empirical results show that, in he year prior to the earnings 
manipulation, stock prices and V/P ratios are similar for earnings manipulators and non-
manipulators. However, in the year of manipulation, stock prices become significantly 
lower and V/P ratios become significantly higher for the manipulators than for the non-
manipulators. These results suggest that the stock mar et does recognize and discount for 
earnings manipulation.  
To further investigate whether the price discount is appropriate and whether intrinsic 
value metrics are good measures of firm value in the presence of earnings management, I 
examine and compare the performances of the V/P ratio portfolio strategies for the 
manipulators and non-manipulators to predict future returns. This strategy is motivated 
by the following argument. Under “long-term” market efficiency (i.e., stocks can be 
mispriced in the short-run, but price is expected to converge to the true intrinsic value in 
the course of a few months), good intrinsic value metrics can identify stock mispricing 
and predict future returns through a V/P ratio portfolio strategy of buying underpriced 
stocks (firms with high V/P ratios) and selling overpriced stocks (firms with low V/P 
ratios). If earnings management impairs the usefulnss of earnings and reduces the ability 
of accounting valuation models to predict firm value, then intrinsic value metrics 
estimated using manipulated earnings will have less ability to identify stock mispricing 
and predict future returns through V/P ratios. My empirical findings suggest that the V/P 




evidence consistent with long-term market efficiency and the ability of intrinsic value 
metrics to identify short-term mispricing and predict future returns through V/P ratios. In 
contrast, the V/P ratio portfolio strategy for the manipulator group is not able to predict 
future returns, providing evidence that earnings management introduces errors in 
earnings and reduces the ability of accounting valuation models to predict firm value.  
 
1.4 Contributions and Implications 
Earnings management and expectations management are two alternative mechanisms 
firms use to MBE. Consistent with recent studies (e.g., Brown and Pinello, 2007), results 
from my dissertation suggest that firms are more lik ly to manipulate analyst 
expectations than to manipulate earnings in order to MBE (27% of the sample are 
classified as expectations manipulators, while only 16% are classified as earnings 
manipulators). This seems to suggest that it is more c stly to manipulate earnings than to 
manipulate analyst expectations, because earnings are subject to the constraints of GAAP 
and the auditing process, while analyst expectations are not.  
In addition, results from both the expectations management and earnings 
management chapters have important implications for the extent of market efficiency. In 
particular, my results indicate that in the absence of management manipulation, the 
market is long-term efficient and intrinsic value mtrics represent good measures for firm 
value; consequently, intrinsic value metrics can identify short-term market mispricing 
and predict future returns through V/P ratios in the long-run when the market corrects its 
mispricing. However, management manipulation (both expectations management and 




the ability of accounting valuation models to predict firm value, but the stock market is 
efficient with such manipulation. Consequently we observe that, when manipulation 
occurs, intrinsic value estimates diverge from stock prices and are less able to identify 
stock mispricing and predict future returns through V/P ratios. Therefore, in light of 
management manipulation (i.e., earnings management and expectations management), 
stock price represents a better measure for firm value than the intrinsic value metrics 
estimated from accounting valuation models. 
This study contributes to accounting research in several respects. It contributes to the 
earnings management and expectations management litera ure by developing a more 
precise measure for expectations management and presenting new evidence on the impact 
of earnings and expectations manipulation on the usefulness of earnings and analyst 
forecasts in firm valuation. In addition, it contributes to the valuation literature by 
emphasizing an important determinant of the performance of accounting valuation 
models, namely management manipulation. In particular, it calls attention to the potential 
negative impact of expectations management and earnings management on the ability of 







CHAPTER 2:  THE IMPACT OF EXPECTATIONS MANAGEMENT 




In this chapter, I examine the impacts of expectations management on the usefulness 
of analyst forecasts in firm valuation. In accounting research, analyst forecasts are used 
as important inputs in firm valuation. Notably, Dechow et al. (1999) and Lee t al. (1999) 
show that using analyst forecasts, instead of forecasts based on past earnings, as a proxy 
for future earnings expectations improves the abilities of residual income valuation 
models to predict firms’ intrinsic values. However, Vickers reports in BusinessWeek that, 
“Companies increasingly are talking down their profit prospects to Wall Street analysts, 
thereby lowering expectations.” In this regard, Cotter et al. (2006) provide empirical 
evidence that analysts are influenced by management a ipulation and quickly revise 
their earnings forecasts in direct response to management guidance. In addition, 
Richardson et al. (1999) document that firms walk down analyst forecasts from the 
beginning to the end of the year to create positive earnings surprises. In the light of such 
expectations management activities, an important research question is whether analyst 
forecasts are still useful in firm valuation? This chapter presents an investigation into this 
issue. Specifically, I first review related literature in Section 2.2. I then develop an 
“improved” measure for expectations management and introduce the valuation model 




sensitivity analyses in Section 2.4 and 2.5. Lastly, I conclude this investigation with some 
remarks in Section 2.6.  
 
2.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Financial analysts provide two broad types of services to stock market participants: 
(i) assimilating and processing publicly available information, and (ii) acquiring and 
disseminating new information (see Das 1998). Since the publication of seminal papers 
by Brown et al. (1987) and O'Brien (1988) that document the superiority f analyst 
forecasts to forecasts based on time-series models, analyst forecasts have come to be 
viewed as the best proxy for market expectations of future earnings. In particular, Frankel 
and Lee (1998) and Dechow et al. (1999) show that using analyst forecasts, instead of 
forecasts based on past earnings, as a proxy for future expected earnings substantially 
improves the abilities of residual income valuation models to predict firms’ intrinsic 
values. In addition, Cheng (2005) suggests that the usefulness of analyst forecasts stems 
from their ability to convey truthful forward-looking information that helps assess and 
predict firms’ current and future performance.   
However, analyst forecasts are subject to management’s manipulation. For 
instance, Laurie P. Cohen, a staff reporter at the Wall Street Journal, wrote that, “…, 
chief financial officers or investor relations reprsentatives traditionally give ‘guidance’ 
to analysts, … they are encouraging analysts to deflate earnings projections to artificially 
low levels.” Academic literature provides further empirical evidence for this claim. For 
example, Cotter et al. (2006) find that analysts quickly revise their earnings forecasts in 




takes place in direct response to explicit management communications. In related studies, 
Richardson et al. (1999) and Bartov et al. (2002) document a decline in analyst forecasts 
from the beginning to the end of the year. They relate this phenomenon to the presence of 
expectations management. A related research question that arises from these studies is 
why firms seemingly issue downward earnings guidance.   
Prior research provides some clues to answering this question. In particular, Kaznik 
and Lev (1995) find that firms facing earnings disappointments are more likely to issue 
earnings guidance to warn investors about the bad news and align market expectations 
with the firms’ true profit prospects. In addition, Skinner (1994) argues that firms make 
pre-emptive bad news disclosures to minimize legal liability and reputation costs. 
However, more recent studies on expectations management argue that firms issue 
downward guidance for the purpose of dampening analysts’ expectations and producing 
beatable forecasts. For instance, Bartov et al. (2002) and Matsumoto (2002) show that 
firms purposefully guide analyst expectations down to produce beatable forecasts by the 
end of the year. Also, Bernhardt and Campello (2007) argue that management guides 
analyst forecasts down, especially near earnings announcement, but such guidance cannot 
be attributed to the arrival of new information.  
If firms guide analyst forecasts down for the purpose f misleading investors and 
producing beatable forecasts, then expectations management activities should introduce 
error into analyst forecasts and reduce the abilities of these forecasts to proxy future 
expected earnings; consequently, valuation models estimated using manipulated forecasts 
may have less ability to predict firms’ true intrins c values. This argument can be stated 




    H1: Expectations management for the purpose of BME introduces error in analyst 
forecasts and reduces the usefulness of analyst forecasts in firm valuation; consequently, 
intrinsic value metrics estimated using manipulated forecasts will have less ability to 
predict firms’ true intrinsic values. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I test this hypothesis and examine the impact of 
expectations management on firm valuation.  
 
2.3 Research Design 
In this section, I develop a measure for expectations management and use it to 
identify firms that manipulated analyst expectations to MBE (expectations manipulators) 
and the firms that did not manipulate analyst expectations (expectations non-
manipulators). Then I use Ohlson’s (1995) residual income valuation model as the 
valuation framework to estimate intrinsic value metrics. Next I describe the analyses used 
to examine the performances of the intrinsic value metrics estimated using manipulated 
versus non-manipulated forecasts to predict firm values. 
 
2.3.1. Expectations Management Measure 
Whether or not a firm has guided analysts to issue relatively low forecasts to MBE 
is inherently unobservable. Prior research has developed two main approaches to identify 
expectations management. In the first approach, advocated by Richardson et al. (1999) 
and Bartov et al. (2002), forecast guidance is suspected when analyst forecasts are 
optimistic at the beginning of a period and pessimitic at the end of the period. This 




the result of manipulation (in the form of downward revision in analyst forecasts). 
However, it has several unappealing features. First, this approach identifies only firms 
that MBE as manipulators, while erroneously classifying as non-manipulators firms that 
did manipulate but failed to guide forecasts down to a sufficiently low level to produce a 
positive forecast error. Second, the optimistic-then-p ssimistic forecast pattern may 
simply be caused by bad news that arises during the year rather than by management’s 
intentional downward guidance. Since this approach does not distinguish between these 
two scenarios, it can misclassify analyst reactions t  bad news as expectations 
manipulation.  
Taking a different approach, Matsumoto (2002) calcul tes an expected forecast 
using prior seasonal changes in earnings and cumulative returns during the year, and 
defines expectations manipulators as firms whose last consensus analyst forecasts are 
lower than the expected forecasts. The strength of is approach is that it identifies 
expectations manipulators regardless of whether or not they successfully MBE. In 
addition, it takes into account the effect of economy-wide and/or firm-specific bad news 
on analyst forecasts. However, a drawback of this approach is that it mechanically 
classifies all firm-years with last consensus forecasts lower than expected forecasts as 
expectations manipulators without considering whether ere are downward revisions in 
analyst forecasts. In particular, Matsumoto’s (2002) approach can misclassify firm-years 
with upward forecast revisions (evidence against expectations management) as 
expectations manipulators.  
The above discussion suggests that, while each appro ch has its strengths and 




purpose of MBE. In principle, a good measure of expectations management should be 
able to: (i) establish that there is a motive to manipulate expectations; (ii) identify 
evidence of downward forecast guidance; and (iii) control for alternative explanations for 
the observed downward guidance. 
In this section, I develop a more precise measure of expectations management for 
the purpose of MBE that attempts to meet the above crit ria. First, I define analyst 
forecast-related measures as follows. Forecast year t st ts from 360 days prior to the 
announcement of year t’s earnings and ends at 1 day prior to the announcement. It 
consists of 12 forecast months, each of which represents a 30-day period. To avoid the 
staleness problem often associated with the consensu  forecasts published by the 
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES), as documented by Richardson et al. 
(1999), I use the last forecast issued by each analyst within each time interval to compute 
the consensus forecast for that time interval. In particular, I define the monthly consensus 
forecast ( itmAF ) as the median of the latest forecast issued by each analyst for firm i in 
month m of year t. Next, I define the early consensus for firm i in year t ( earlyitAF ) as the 
median of the latest forecast issued by each analyst for firm i in the first three months of 
year t, and the late consensus for firm i in year t ( lateitAF ) as the median of the latest 
forecast issued by each analyst in the last three months of year t. Finally, I use the 
following two steps to classify a firm-year as eithr an expectations manipulator or a non-
manipulator. 
 




Bartov et al. (2002) identify initial analyst optimism as the necessary condition for 
concluding expectations management. The rationale for this argument is that if a firm’s 
management believes at the beginning of the year that the existing forecasts are rationale 
and beatable, they perceive that there is no need to manipulate expectations down to MBE. 
However, Bartov et al.’s approach involves using forward-looking earnings information 
that is unavailable at the beginning of the year. To avoid this shortcoming, I use the 
previous year’s reported earnings ( 1−itEarn ) as a proxy for management’s earnings 
expectation at the beginning of the current year (earlyitMF ).To the extent that a firm’s 
performance does not change dramatically overnight, the previous year’s earnings arguably 
represent a reasonable proxy for the current year’s rnings at the beginning of the year. 
Furthermore, Degeorge et al. (1999) find that firms perceive “avoiding earnings decrease” 
as a more important threshold than MBE. This suggests that firms will be motivated to 
manipulate analyst forecasts down to MBE only if they can exceed the prior year’s 
earnings. Therefore, I identify each firm’s motive to manipulate analyst expectations by 
comparing the previous year’s earnings ( 1−itEarn ) with the consensus forecast in the early 
period ( earlyitAF ). I then classify firms with AFit
early > Earnit −1 as possible manipulators and 
the remaining firms as non-manipulators. 
 
Step 2: Is there any evidence of management-guided downward forecast revisions? 
 Downward revisions in analyst forecasts represent indirect evidence for 
management forecast guidance. However, expectations ma agement is only one of the 
factors that can lead to downward revisions in analyst forecasts. This second step is 




management. These other factors include (i) analyst bia  and (ii) unexpected economy-
wide and/or firm-specific good/bad news that arises throughout the year. To elaborate on 
the first factor, Richardson et al. (1999) argue that analysts balance their need to please 
management against their need to please investors. In particular, they please management 
by issuing optimistic forecasts at the beginning of the year, which project good images to 
the market about firms’ future performances. They pl ase investors by producing 
accurate forecasts just prior to earnings announcements, when forecast accuracy is most 
salient. This suggests that some of the downward revisions in analyst forecasts may result 
from analyst bias rather than from expectations management. In this chapter, I use a 
regression-based method to control for revisions cau ed by the two alternative factors. 
Specifically, I consider the regression model  
             Revit = b0 + b1CRETit + vit ,                                              (2.1) 
where the itv  are identically and independently distributed random error terms with mean 
0 and variance 2vσ ; Revit  is the change in analyst consensus forecasts from the beginning 
to the end of the year, i.e., AFit
late − AFit
early; and CRETit  is the cumulative return for firm i 
during year t. In (2.1), I use the intercept term to capture analysts’ general tendency to be 
optimistic and the cumulative return during the year, and CRETit , to account for the 
impacts of economy-wide and/or firm-specific news on analyst forecast revisions. I 
estimate this regression for each year and use the residual from the regression as a 
measure for the unexpected forecast revision ( itU ExpRev ). Then, I classify firm-years 
with unexpected downward revisions ( itUnExpRev< 0) as possible manipulators and the 
remaining firm-years as non-manipulators. Finally, I define expectations manipulators as 




In Section 2.4.2., I conduct a validity test to demonstrate the validity of my measure 
and compare its performance with the performances of other existing measures at 
detecting management forecast guidance. 
 
2.3.2. Residual Income Valuation Model 
I use Ohlson’s (1995) residual income valuation model as the valuation framework to 
estimate intrinsic value metrics. Ohlson (1995) start  with the dividend-discounting 
model, which states that the market value of a firm's equity ( itV ) at year t equals the 









τ rdE =V ittit                           (2.2) 
He also assumes a clean-surplus relation  
   itititit dxbb −+= −1 ,                            (2.3) 
where itb  is the beginning of period t accounting book value of shareholders’ equity 
and itx  is period t earnings.  The clean-surplus assumption allows him to substitute book 
value and abnormal earnings for dividends in the dividend-discounting model. Ohlson 
(1995) defines the other information variable as the difference between the conditional 
expectation of abnormal earnings based on all availble information ( ][ aitt xE ) and the 
expectation of abnormal earnings based only on last period abnormal earnings ( aitx 1−ω ). 




ittt xxEv 1][ −−= ω .                           (2.4)   
Ohlson further assumes linear information dynamics (LID) for the time-series behaviour 








it uvxx 111 ++= −−ω                               (2.5) 
and other information  
   ititit uvv 21 += −γ .                                             (2.6) 
LID allow him to express firm value as a function of b ok value, abnormal earnings and 
other information  
it
a
ititit vaxb =V 2111 ++ −− α ,                            (2.7)  
where α 1 = ω /(1 + r − ω )  and α 2 = (1 + r ) /(1 + r − ω )(1 + r − γ ) .  
A model introduced subsequently by Feltham and Ohlson (1995) retains the basic 
structure of the original model in Ohlson (1995). However, it breaks down both income 
statements and balance sheet components into their operating and financing activities to 
separately assess how they affect firm value. It then makes LID assumptions for 
abnormal operating earnings, operating assets, and other information to express firm 
value in terms of book value, operating assets, abnormal operating earnings, and other 
information. One advantage of this model is that, by separately modeling operating and 
financial assets, the model allows for accounting conservatism (i.e., the market value and 
book value of operating assets can be different). 
Whether the model proposed by Ohlson (1995) or the subsequent model introduced 
by Feltham and Ohlson (1995) performs better in estimating firm value is currently an 
unresolved issue in the valuation literature. For instance, in comparing the performances 
between the two models, Hand (2001) argues that, “though conservatism seems to be a 
pervasive attribute of U.S. GAAP, it may be the case that conservatism has an immaterial 
impact on the mapping of accounting data into price. It is unclear if a model that takes 




does the Ohlson 1995 [model]”. It is important to stre s that the objective of this chapter 
is not to compare the empirical performances of these valuation models. Rather, it is to 
use a valuation model as a framework to examine the usefulness analyst one-year-ahead 
forecasts in firm valuation. With this in mind, I choose the original model in Ohlson 
(1995) over the model in Feltham and Ohlson (1995) because the empirical 
implementation of “other information” in Ohlson’s model (1995) requires only one-year-
ahead forecasts (Dechow et al., 1999), while the implementation of Feltham and 
Ohlson’s (1995) model requires forecasts for both one- and two-year-ahead earnings (see 
Begley and Feltham, 2002). Obviously the quality of b th types of forecasts has 
implications for the model’s performance, but given that managers may manipulate 
current-year and longer-term forecasts differently, i  is difficult to separately measure the 
effect of one while controlling for that of the other. Since my study in this chapter 
focuses on manipulation of current-year forecasts, using Ohlson’s (1995) model provides 
a cleaner setting in which to investigate the issue of interest to this chapter. 
I estimate Ohlson’s (1995) valuation model using analyst forecasts to obtain 
monthly intrinsic value metrics (itmV ). Specifically, following Dechow et al. (1999), I use 
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itmitm xAFv 1−−= ω .                                          (2.9) 
Thus, the monthly intrinsic value metrics can be expr ssed as  
        itm
a




where )1/(1 tt r ωωα −+=  and )1(2 r+=α )1)(1/( tmt rr γω −+−+ . In this expression, tω  
and tmγ  are the first-order autoregressive coefficients for abnormal earnings and other 
information respectively. The parameter tω is estimated for each year t using the prior 





it uxx ,1,0 ++= −ωω ,                              (2.11)  
and the parameter tmγ  is estimated for each year-month (,m) using the prior five years’ 
data in the pooled time-series cross-sectional regression   
mtitmmti vv ,1,0,, −+= γγ  tu ,2+ .                                    (2.12)  
Frankel and Lee (1998) use a fixed rate of 12% as the cost of capital (r). They 
explain that the choice of cost of capital (either a fixed rate of 12% or the industry-
specific cost of capital estimated from the Fama and French three-factor model) has little 
effect on their cross-sectional analysis. In addition, Lee et al. (1999) argue that a time-
varying cost of capital is crucial in time-series analysis. Therefore they compute the time-
varying cost of capital as the sum of a time-varying risk free rate, and a consistent 
premium above that risk free rate. They find that te variations in risk premium (either a 
fixed rate or the industry-specific premium) do notimpact their result. Since my study 
employs a time-series analysis, I follow Lee et al (1999) to compute the cost of capital as 
a sum of the monthly risk free rate and a fixed risk premium. The risk premium used by 
prior studies range from 3%-8%. In this study, I use a lower end of 3% in the main 
analysis. As a sensitivity analysis, I conduct the stock tracking ability test using the 




Panel B of Table 3 and Panel B of Figure 1, demonstrate hat the choice of risk premium 
does not affect inferences in the main analysis. 
 
2.3.3. Testing the Performance of the Valuation Model to Track or Predict Firm 
Value 
Prior research, such as Frankel and Lee (1998) and Lee et al. (1999), has examined 
the performance of the valuation models by testing the ability of intrinsic value metrics to 
track stock prices and predict future returns. 
It is clear that the extent of market efficiency has implications for the choice of tests 
for stock tracking ability. Specifically, if the market is efficient in the short run, in the 
sense that stock price correctly reflects the true intrinsic value at all times, then intrinsic 
value metrics that most closely track stock prices are more accurate proxies for intrinsic 
value. In this case, the ability of valuation models to predict intrinsic value can be 
assessed by examining the correlations between intri sic value measures (calculated from 
these valuation models) and stock prices. With the exception of Lee et al. (1999), most 
research has invoked the efficient market hypothesis a  a maintained assumption and 
examined valuation models in this cross-sectional approach. Taking a different 
perspective, Lee t al. (1999) argue that the market may not be fully efficient at all times 
because the process by which price adjusts to intrinsic value requires time. In particular, 
arbitrage costs in the short run may prevent price f om converging to the intrinsic value 
instantaneously; however, in the long run, market forces drive the price to the 
fundamental. Lee t al. (1999) find that it takes on average 3-4 months for stock price to 




efficient. If the market is long-term efficient, then stock price is not the best proxy for 
intrinsic value and, thus, it is inappropriate to assess intrinsic value metrics by their 
contemporaneous correlations with stock prices. To construct an appropriate test in this 
case, Lee et al. (1999) model the time-series relation between price (P) and true intrinsic 
value (V* ) as a co-integrated system:1  
          ttt VP ε+= )log()log(
*                (2.13) 
Similarly, they model the time-series relation betwen intrinsic value (V) and true 
intrinsic value (V* ) as a co-integrated equation:  
ttt VV ω+= )log()log(
* .                  (2.14) 
In this framework, a good intrinsic value metric tV  would have a zero mean error term 
( tω = 0), a low standard deviation, and quick mean reversion. Since the true intrinsic 
values *tV  are unobservable, they consider the difference between (2.13) and (2.14), 
       tttt PV εω −=)/log(   .                                (2.15) 
In this alternative form, the time-series properties of error tε  are set by market forces and 
the properties of the V/P ratio depend on those oftω . Lee et al. (1999) examine the time-
series properties (in particular, the stationarity) of the V/P ratio to assess the usefulness of 
analyst-based value metrics (V), expecting better intrinsic value estimates to yield V/P 
ratios that have lower standard deviations and faster rates of mean-reversion. In the 
context of my study, I expect expectations management to reduce the ability of the 
intrinsic value metrics V to predict the true intris c values. That is, I expect the V/P 
                                                
1If two or more time series are themselves non-station ry, but a linear combination of them is stationary, 





ratios for intrinsic value metrics V estimated using manipulated forecasts to be less 
stationary (i.e., with higher standard deviations and slower rates of mean-reversion) than 
those for intrinsic value metrics Vestimated using non-manipulated forecasts. 
To date, the extent of market efficiency (i.e., how long it takes price to converge to 
intrinsic value) is an unresolved issue. To ensure that my results do not depend on any 
particular assumption about market efficiency, in this chapter I conduct both cross-
sectional and time-series analyses to see whether consistent inferences can emerge from 
this exercise. Assuming that expectations management i pairs firm valuation, I predict 
that, if the market is efficient in the short run, i trinsic value metrics estimated using 
manipulated forecasts will have lower correlations with stock prices. On the other hand, 
if the market is long-term efficient, I predict tha intrinsic value metrics estimated using 
manipulated forecasts will yield V/P ratios with more volatile and more persistent time 
series. 
The V/P ratio portfolio returns test also relies on the assumption of long-term 
market efficiency. In particular, if the market is not fully efficient at all times but stock 
prices converge to true intrinsic values over the course of a few months, then good 
intrinsic value metrics will be able to identify short-run mispricing and predict future 
returns over the long-run as the market corrects itself. If expectations management 
diminishes the quality of analyst forecasts as inputs for constructing intrinsic value 
estimates, we should observe that V/P ratios estimated with manipulated forecasts are 
less able to predict future returns than V/P ratios estimated with non-manipulated 
forecasts. Therefore, in the return predictability analysis, I examine whether the V/P 




have greater predictive power for future returns than the V/P ratio-based portfolio 
strategies where V is estimated using manipulated forecasts. 
 
2.4 Empirical Analyses 
In this section, I examine the impact of expectations management on firm valuation 
by comparing the abilities of intrinsic value metrics estimated using manipulated and 
non-manipulated forecasts to track stock prices and pre ict future returns. 
 
2.4.1 Data Collection and Sample Statistics 
The sample consists of non-financial and non-regulated U.S. firms for the time 
period from 1988 to 2005. The descriptive statistics in the sample selection process are 
reported in Table 1. I obtain analyst forecasts and the corresponding actual EPS data from  
the IBES History U.S. Edition tape (Actual File) through the Wharton Research Data 
Services (WRDS) database. This results in 14,335 firms and 88,600 firm-years for the 
period. I then match this sample to the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database and Compustat. Matching from IBES to CRSP through CUSIP and deleting 
non-matches and duplicates reduces the sample to 11,414 firms and 71,497 firm-years. 
Matching from CRSP to Compustat through CUSIP to obtain GVKEY (the Compustat 
unique identifier) further reduces the sample to 10,707 firms and 67,669 firm-years. 
Richardson et al. (1999) and Matsumoto (2002) exclude regulated and financial firms 
because their accounting rules differ from those of firms in other industries and they may 
therefore have different motives with respect to expectations management. Following this 




and 46,043 firm-years. Requiring firm-years to have sufficient data to compute the 
expectations management measure further reduces the sample to 5,535 firms and 30,223 
firm-years. I then randomly select 20% of the total firm-years to use as the validation 
sample to test my expectations management measure, and use the remaining 80% of the 
firm-years as the test sample to conduct the cross-sectional, time-series, and returns 
predictability analyses.  
In the cross-sectional analysis, where I examine the change in correlations between 
prices and intrinsic value metrics from the beginning to the end of the year, I require the 
observations to have valid intrinsic value metrics at the beginning and the end of the year. 
This data requirement reduces the final test sample from 5,272 firms and 24,179 firm-
years to 4,834 firms and 22,190 firm-years.  
In the time-series analysis, where I examine the within-year time-series properties 
of bi-monthly V/P ratios, I require the firm-year observations to have valid intrinsic value 
estimates (V) in each of the six two-month intervals. This requirement reduces the usable 
test sample to 3,436 firms and 13,729 firm-years. Note that I do not require firms to have 
valid intrinsic value estimates at every month because doing so would result in a 
significant sample reduction, from 4,834 firms and 22,190 firm-years to 2,219 firms and 
8,514 firm-years.  
 
2.4.2 Validation of the Expectations Management Measure 
This validity check is intended to examine whether my expectations management 
measure, which is based on indirect evidence of expectations management, has power to 




through public management earnings forecasts; this has been especially true since the 
passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), which prohibits firms from 
communicating private information with analysts. First Call maintains a dataset of 
prospective earnings-related announcements made by companies after September 1990. 
In this database (referred to as CIG), the “CIGCODED” field indicates whether the 
guidance is classified as negative, positive or neutral. A negative classification indicates 
that the management forecast is below the current expectation, providing evidence for 
downward forecast guidance. A non-negative classificat on indicates that the 
management forecast is at or above the current expectation, providing evidence against 
downward forecast guidance. Since forecast direction pr vides direct evidence for 
forecast guidance, management forecasts can be used to identify expectations 
management. However, out of the 6,044 firm-years in the validation sample, only 644 (or 
11%) have management forecast data in the CIG database. Due to the sparseness of 
management forecasts and the resulting significant restriction in sample size, in this study 
I choose to identify expectations management based on the pattern of analyst forecast 
revisions as described above in Section 2.3.1. To validate my expectations management 
measure, I select from my validation sample the firm-years that have management 
guidance data in the CIG database. To compare my measur  to the existing measures, I 
apply the classification schemes of Bartov et al. (2002) and Matsumoto (2002) to my 
sample. 
A comparison of these three alternative expectations management measures is 
shown in Panel A of Table 2. My approach classifies 25% of the 644 CIG observations as 




and Matsumoto’s approach classifies 41% as manipulators. Note that, compared to the 
other two approaches, Matsumoto’s approach classifie  significantly more observations 
as manipulators. This is potentially because Matsumoto’s approach does not require firms 
to demonstrate initial optimism or downward forecast revisions in order to be classified 
as manipulators. Bartov et al.’s approach classifies more firm-years as manipulators than 
my measure does. This is potentially because, when using downward revisions as 
evidence for forecast guidance, Bartov et al.’s approach does not control for the fact that 
some of the downward revisions are due to analysts’ systematic bias and/or bad news 
occurred during the year. 
To compare the abilities of the alternative classification approaches to capture the 
notion of expectations management, I examine their effectiveness at detecting 
management’s direct actions to guide analyst forecasts. If an expectations management 
classification approach is able to capture management forecast guidance, then we expect 
that the classified manipulators to be more likely than the classified non-manipulators to 
have downward management guidance (evidence for expectations management) and less 
likely to have upward/neutral management guidance (evidence against expectations 
management).  
I compare the three alternative approaches according to this criterion. The results 
are shown in Panel B of Table 2.  
The firm-years that my approach classifies as expectations manipulators are 130% 




management guidance and 33% less likely to have upward/neutral guidance.2 The chi-
square statistic of 42.5 suggests that this group difference is statistically significant. This 
provides evidence to support the ability of my approach to capture direct evidence of 
management forecast guidance. In comparison, using Bartov et al.’s approach, the 
expectations manipulators are 112% more likely than t e non-manipulators to receive 
downward management guidance and 29% less likely than t e non-manipulators to 
receive upward/neutral management guidance; whereas using Matsumoto’s approach, 
expectations manipulators are 119% more likely than t e non-manipulators to receive 
downward management guidance and 26% less likely than t e non-manipulators to 
receive upward/neutral management guidance. Althoug Matsumoto’s and Bartov et al.’s 
approaches both show the correct pattern, in the sense that the classified manipulators are 
more likely than the non-manipulators to receive downward management guidance and 
less likely to receive upward/neutral guidance, their results are weaker than mine  (i.e., 
130% vs. 112% vs. 119% and -33% vs. -29% vs. -26%). This is also evident by their 
smaller chi-square statistics (34.5 and 36.7 respectively). Taken together, these results 
provide evidence that my measure captures management action to guide forecasts 
downward, and does so better than the existing measur s. However, it is worth noting 
that, unlike my classification approach, the direction of management forecast obtained 
from the CIG database does not adjust the direction of guidance by the contemporary 
good/bad news contained in management forecasts. Consequently, my classification 
approach does not align perfectly with the direction of management forecast guidance 
reported in the CIG database. For instance, about half of the firm-years that I classify as 
                                                
2 Note that if the classified manipulators are more lik ly to have downward forecast guidance, they will by 
definition be less likely to have upward/neutral forecast guidance; the downward and upward/neutral 




expectations manipulators actually have upward or neutral management forecasts before 
controlling for the good/bad news contained in these forecasts. Therefore, examining the 
directions of management forecasts from the CIG database is not a perfect validation test, 
though it does provide some evidence about the relativ  performances of the alternative 
classification approaches. 
 
2.4.3 Stock Tracking Ability—Cross-sectional Analysis   
In the cross-sectional analysis, I assume that the market is efficient at all times and 
that stock price is the best proxy for intrinsic value (see Frankel and Lee, 1998). 
Therefore, better intrinsic value metrics have higher correlations with stock prices. 
Furthermore, if the market can recognize firms’ intentional manipulation of analyst 
forecasts, then stock prices will not change in the dir ction of forecast revisions if these 
revisions are due to management manipulation. Consequently, the intrinsic value metrics 
estimated using manipulated forecasts will diverge f om the stock prices once 
manipulation occurs. I therefore predict that the correlations between prices and intrinsic 
value estimates for the manipulators will decline from the beginning of the year (before 
manipulation has occurred) to the end of the year (after expectations management has 
occurred and has been recognized by the market). However, I expect no systematic 
decline in the correlations for the non-manipulators because there should be no 
systematic divergence between intrinsic value estimates and stock prices in the absence 
of expectations management. Therefore, I examine and compare the changes in the cross-




expectations manipulators and non-manipulators from the beginning to the end of the 
manipulation year.  
I first graph the monthly sample correlations for the manipulators and non-
manipulators throughout the year to see whether there is, as predicted, a decline in 
correlations for the manipulators and an absence of decline for the non-manipulators. For 
each group in each year t and month m, I compute the monthly cross-sectional sample 
correlations between the monthly intrinsic value metrics ( itmV ) and the stock prices at the 
end of each month (itmP ). I then compute the across-year means of these annual monthly 
cross-sectional sample correlations. I graph in Figure 1 these mean monthly sample 
correlations for the manipulator and non-manipulator gr ups to depict the correlation 
patterns from the beginning to the end of the year. As mentioned earlier, to demonstrate 
that the choice of the risk premium in estimating the intrinsic value metrics does not 
affect inferences about the intrinsic value metrics, I estimate the intrinsic value metrics 
using two alternative risk premiums:  3% and 8%. I report monthly sample correlations 
between prices and intrinsic value metrics estimated using a 3% risk premium in Panel A 
of Figure 1, and between prices and intrinsic value metrics estimated using an 8% risk 
premium in Panel B. As shown in Panel A of Figure 1, the correlation patterns differ 
between the manipulator and non-manipulator samples in the manner predicted. For the 
manipulators, the sample correlations decline sharply in the middle of the year 
(presumably when expectations management occurs and is recognized by the market), 
whereas non-manipulators show no apparent decline in sample correlations from the 
beginning to the end of the year. Note that the pattern in Panel B mirrors that in Panel A, 




further examine whether these correlation changes are t tistically significant, I conduct 
the following test: for each group, I use the consensus analyst forecast in the first three 
months of the year ( earlyitAF ) to estimate the intrinsic value metrics at the beginning of the 
year ( earlyitV ). I then use 
early
itV  and the stock prices at the end of the third month (
early
itP ) to 
compute the cross-sectional sample correlations between V and P for each group at the 
beginning of each year. I denote these early correlations by ),( VPCorr earlyit . Similarly, I 
use the consensus analyst forecast in the last three months of the year ( lateitAF ) to 
compute the intrinsic value metrics at the end of the year ( lateitV ). I then use 
late
itV  and the 
stock prices at the end of the twelfth month (lateitP ) to compute the cross-sectional sample 
correlations between Vand P at the end of the year. I denote these late correlations by 
),( VPCorr lateit . I report the annual statistics on ),( VPCorr
early
it  and ),( VPCorr
late
it  in 
Table 3. The last row, “All years”, reports the means of these annual statistics across all 
years. The t-statistics are based on the time-series standard errors of the annual statistics. 
Again, intrinsic value metrics are estimated using two alternative risk premiums of 3% 
and 8%. Panel A reports results using a 3% risk premium and Panel B reports results 
using an 8% risk premium. As shown in Panel A, across all years, the sample correlations 
for the manipulators decline from 0.55 at the beginning of the year to 0.49 by the end of 
the year. This total decline of 0.06 is statistically significant at the 5% level (with a t 
statistic, t = -2.04). In contrast, there is no systematic declin  in sample correlations for 
the non-manipulators from the beginning to the end of the year. The average sample 
correlation is 0.56 at both the beginning and the end of the year. At the beginning of the 




and non-manipulators (0.55 versus 0.56 with t = 0.53). The difference in sample 
correlation changes between the manipulator and non-ma ipulator groups is therefore 
−0.06. This difference is statistically significant at the 5% level (with t = -3.07).  Results 
in Panel B are consistent with those in Panel A, providing evidence that the choice of risk 
premium does not affect inference in the cross-sectional test. 
 Overall, the significant decline in monthly correlations between stock prices and 
intrinsic value metrics estimated using manipulated forecasts and the lack of decline in 
correlations for intrinsic value metrics estimated using non-manipulated forecasts point to  
the negative impact of expectations management on the abilities of intrinsic value metrics 
to track stock prices. These results show that the market can recognize and discount for 
expectations management at least in the long-run over a 9-month interval; they, therefore, 
provide evidence in support of long-term market efficiency with respect to expectations 
management. 
 
2.4.4 Stock Tracking Ability—Time-series Analysis 
In the time-series analysis, I examine the within-year time-series properties (i.e., 
standard deviation and the first-order autocorrelation) of bi-monthly V/P ratios for the 
manipulators and non-manipulators. Since requiring the firm-year observations to have 
valid intrinsic value metrics in each month significantly reduces the sample size, I relax 
this requirement by estimating intrinsic value metrics in every two-month interval. 
Specifically, I partition each forecast year into six two-month intervals and estimate 
intrinsic value metrics at the end of every two months. These bi-monthly intrinsic value 




as the median of the latest forecast issued by each analyst within every two-month period. 
I require each firm-year to have valid intrinsic value estimates in each of the six two-
month periods. I then use these bi-monthly intrinsic value metrics to compute the bi-
monthly V/P ratios for each group in each year as follows. I aggregate individual V and P 
estimates for each group to form the portfolio V and P estimates for each group at every 
two-month interval in each year (i.e., MymV , /
N
ymV ,  
and MymP , /
N
ymP , ). I then use these 
aggregate V and P estimates to compute the portfoli V/P ratio for each group in each 
two-month interval of each year (i.e., MymPV ,/  
and NymPV ,/ ).  
Assuming that the market is efficient over a period of several months, better 
intrinsic value metrics will yield a more stationary V/P time-series with a smaller 
standard deviation and a quicker mean reversion (see Le  et al. 1999). If expectations 
management impairs firm valuation as hypothesized, then the within-year across-month 
time series of V/P ratios for V estimated using manipulated forecasts will be more 
volatile and more persistent than the time series of V/P ratios, where V is estimated using 
non-manipulated forecasts. I measure volatility by the standard deviation and measure 
persistence by the first-order autocorrelation coeffici nt of the bi-monthly V/P ratios. 
Panels A and B of Table 4 report the annual bi-monthly V/P ratios along with the 
standard deviations and first-order autocorrelation c efficients of these V/P ratios for the 
manipulator and non-manipulator groups respectively. I take the means of these statistics 
across the 18 years (1988 to 2005) for each manipulat on group and report these summary 
statistics in the last rows of these two panels. In Pa el C of the table I report the 
differences in standard deviations and the coefficints of the first-order autoregressions 




Panel C are based on the time-series standard errors f om the annual statistics.  On 
average, the manipulators have larger standard deviations than the non-manipulators 
(0.04 versus 0.02), and this difference of 0.02 is statistically significant at the 5% level 
(with t = 6.58). The average value of the coefficients in the first-order autocorrelation 
processes for the bi-monthly V/P ratios across all years is 0.32 for the manipulator group 
and 0.26 for the non-manipulator group. The difference between these two groups, 0.06, 
is also statistically significant at the 5% level (with t = 2.34). This suggests that, for the 
non-manipulators, innovations to V/P time-series lose their intensity more quickly, so 
that V/P reverts back to its long run mean faster in the months subsequent to a deviation. 
Overall, these results show that the expectations manipulators have a more volatile and 
more persistent V/P time series than the non-manipulators do. Taken together, they 
provide consistent evidence in support of my working hypothesis that expectations 
management impairs the usefulness of forecasts in firm valuation and reduces the abilities 
of the resulting intrinsic value estimates to track stock price variations in the long run. 
 
2.4.5. Return Predictability Analysis 
As detailed earlier, assuming the market is efficient over the long-run,  in the sense 
that price converge to the true intrinsic value in the course of a few months, better 
intrinsic value metrics will have greater abilities to identify temporary stock mispricing 
and predict future returns through V/P ratios. This is because stock prices may measure 
firms’ fundamental values with error and good intrisic value metrics can identify such 
security mispricing (see Dechow et al. 1999). If expectations management impairs firm 




intrinsic value metrics estimated using manipulated forecasts are less able to predict 
future returns than intrinsic value metrics estimated using non-manipulated forecasts. I 
replicate Dechow et al. (1999)’s V/P ratio portfolio strategy to examine th  buy-hold 
returns for expectations manipulators and non-manipulators in the 12 months following 
expectations manipulation. Since according to my classification process, expectations 
management is identified in the last month of a forecast year, I use V estimated in the last 
month and examine how manipulators and non-manipulators differ in their abilities to 
predict future returns through V/P ratios.  
To ensure that the sample firm-years are aligned in calendar time, I use firms that 
report in February as the sample for the returns test. To implement the test, for each 
manipulation group in each year, I rank firms by V/P ratio and assign them into quintiles. 
I then compute the equally-weighted buy-hold stock return for each quintile portfolio of 
each group over the subsequent 12 months. Assuming that V is a good proxy for intrinsic 
value, the top V/P quintile (Q5) consists of stocks that are underpriced relative to intrinsic 
value and are expected to experience higher future returns; the bottom V/P quintile (Q1) 
contains stocks that are overpriced and are expected to xperience lower future returns. 
The hedge portfolio return, which is the difference between the returns for Q5 and Q1, 
summarizes the predictive ability of V/P ratio with respect to future returns. I report the 
yearly and across-year average V/P quintile returns and hedge portfolio returns for the 
manipulators and non-manipulators in Panels A and B of Table 5. The t-statistics for the 
across-year average returns are computed from the standard errors of the annual statistics. 
In Panel C I report the differences in annual portfolio returns between the manipulator 




return difference between the two groups. The t-statistics are computed from the standard 
errors of the annual statistics. 
For the manipulators, the hedge portfolio return is -7% and this return is not 
statically significant (with t = -0.50); for the non-manipulators, the hedge portfolio return 
is 9% over a 12 month period and this return is statically significant at a 10% level (with t 
= 1.38). The difference in average hedge portfolio returns between manipulators and non-
manipulators is therefore -16%; this return differenc  is statistically significant at the 5% 
level (with t = -3.98). 
Overall, these returns results suggest that [i] the market is long-term efficient, in the 
sense that there is potential mis-pricing in the short-run but price converges to true 
intrinsic value over the long-run,  and [ii] the intr sic value metrics are able to identify 
short-term market mispricing and predict future retu ns through V/P ratios in the long-
run; however, expectations management reduces the ability of intrinsic value metrics to 
identify stock mispricing and predict future returns through the V/P ratios.  
 
2.5 Sensitivity Analyses 
In this section, I perform sensitivity checks for the results obtained the main 
analyses. 
 
2.5.1 Sub-period Analysis of the Cross-sectional Test 
A closer look at the yearly cross-sectional results in Table 3 reveals that the 
correlation difference between manipulators and non-ma ipulators is most significant in 




is not driven by this abnormal time period, I exclude these three years in this sensitivity 
analysis. The results show that after excluding the Int rnet bubble period, the difference 
in average correlation changes between manipulators nd non-manipulators is 0.023, and 
statistically significant at the 5% level (with  = 1.98). This suggests that the difference in 
correlation changes between manipulators and non-manipul tors as reported in the main 
analysis is not specific to the Internet bubble period. 
 
2.5.2. Fama and French Returns Tests 
In the returns analysis reported in Section 2.4.5, I replicated Dechow et al. 
(1999)’s V/P ratio portfolio strategy to examine th buy-hold returns for expectations 
manipulators and non-manipulators in the 12 months following expectations 
manipulation. My results suggested that intrinsic value metrics estimated using 
manipulated forecasts were less able to predict future returns than those estimated using 
non-manipulated forecasts. However, the documented difference in returns between 
manipulator and non-manipulator groups may have been attribiutable to the different risk 
characteristics between these two groups. In fact, Beaver (2002), Kothari (2001), and Lo 
and Lys (2000) express the concern that high V/P firms may have higher risks and, 
therefore, the returns to V/P ratio portfolio strategy may be caused by uncontrolled risk 
factors. To address the possibility that the difference in V/P ratio portfolio returns 
between the manipulator and non-manipulator groups are due to differences in risks 
between the two groups, I use the calendar-time appro ch Fama and French returns 




adjusted V/P ratio portfolio returns and compare the return performances between the two 
manipulation groups.  
To ensure that the sample firm-years are aligned in calendar time, I use the 1,478 
firms and 4,307 firm-years that report earnings in February as my usable sample. I choose 
to use February, because compared to other months it ha the most firms reporting. To 
implement the strategy, for each manipulation group in February of each year, I rank 
firms by V/P ratios and partition them into quintiles. I then obtain the monthly returns for 
each firm for the next 12 months. For each manipulation group, I compute the average 
monthly return for each V/P quintile (Retm,t
Qn). Specifically, Retm,t
Q5_M represents the 
average monthly return to the top V/P quintile for the manipulator group in month m of 
year t; Retm,t
Q1_M represents the average monthly return to the bottom V/P quintile for the 
manipulator group in month m of year t; Retm,t
Q5 _N represents the average monthly return to 
the top V/P quintile for the non-manipulator group in month m of year t; 
andRetm,t
Q1_N represents the average monthly return to the bottom V/P quintile for the non-
manipulator group in month m of year t. 
 I obtain the Fama and French risk factors and the momentum factor from the “Fama-
French, Momentum, and Liquidity” dataset on the WRDS database. I then regress the 
monthly returns for the top and bottom V/P quintiles for each manipulation group on the 
risk factors as follows: 
       Retm,t
Q5 _M = αm,t
Q5_M + β1MktRFm,t + β2SMBm,t + β3HMLm,t + β4UMDm,t + εm,t
Q5 _M    (2.16) 
      Retm,t
Q1_M = αm,t
Q1_M + β1MktRFm,t + β2SMBm,t + β3HMLm,t + β4UMDm,t + εm,t
Q1_M         (2.17) 
      Retm,t
Q5 _N = αm,t
Q5 _N + β1MktRFm,t + β2SMBm,t + β3HMLm,t + β4UMDm,t + εm,t
Q5_N         (2.18) 
Retm,t
Q1_N = αm,t
Q1_N + β1MktRFm,t + β2SMBm,t + β3HMLm,t + β4UMDm,t + εm,t










~α as the risk-adjusted monthly quintile 
returns to the top and bottom V/P quintiles for the non-manipulator group. I then compute 
the risk-adjusted V/P ratio hedged portfolio return as the difference in the risk-adjusted 






~α ). The t-statistics on 
the hedged portfolio returns are computed using the means and standard deviations of the 
two quintile returns. I report these risk-adjusted quintile returns and hedged-portfolio 
returns in Table 6. 
Results on the individual quintile returns show that, for the non-manipulator group, 
the top V/P quintile is able to earn a significant positive return of 0.008 (with t = 2.66), 
while the return to the bottom V/P quintile is 0.004 and is not statistically significant at a 
5% level (with t = 1.69). The hedge portfolio return, which is the difference in the risk-
adjusted returns between the top and bottom V/P quintiles, is 0.004, and this return is 
statistically significant at a 5% level (with  = 4.20). This provides evidence to support 
the ability of the intrinsic value metrics for the non-manipulators to identify stock 
mispricing and predict future returns through V/P ratios. In contrast, for the manipulator 
group, both the top and bottom V/P quintiles are unable to earn abnormal returns after 
controlling for risks; that is, the returns of -0.03 and 0.006 are statistically insignificant 
at a 5% level (with t = 0.65 and t = 1.27 respectively). The difference in risk-adjusted 
returns between the top and bottom V/P quintiles is negative (-0.009) and statistically 
significant at 5% level (with t = -5.41). As mentioned earlier, if the intrinsic value metrics 
represents a good measure for firm value, I expect to see the return to the top V/P quintile 
to be higher than that to the bottom V/P quintile. This negative and significant return 




metrics for the manipulators is not a good measure for firm value and it cannot identify 
stock mispricing and predict future returns. Overall, these returns result provide further 
evidence in support of the hypothesis that expectations management introduces errors 
into analyst forecasts and reduces the ability of accounting valuation models to predict 
firm value.  
 
2.5.3. Imputed Discount Rate 
In this validation test, I calculate the imputed discount rate for the two groups and 
examine whether the imputed rate is higher for the manipulator group than for the non-
manipulator group. I use the following steps to compute the imputed cost of capital. First, 
I collect the data and construct the variables (except the cost of capital variable) used in 
the valuation model. I then solve for the implied discount rate that equates the estimated 
intrinsic value from the model to the current stock price. However, it is important to note 
that when equating price to intrinsic value estimate, we are making an implicit 
assumption that the valuation model is correct in pr cing securities at all times. Strictly 
speaking, the assumption is tenuous in the context of my study. In fact, the results in the 
returns test of the main analyses suggest that stock pri e is not the best measure for value 
at all times. Instead, stocks are mispriced in the short-run, but price converges to true 
intrinsic value over the course of a few months. In addition, my results also show that the 
valuation model produces inaccurate estimates for firm value when expectations 
manipulation occurs. Therefore, it is logically incorrect to equate price to intrinsic value 
estimate to solve for r. To further demonstrate this point, I use the following formulas to 




solve for the imputed discount rate. First I equate price to intrinsic value metrics 
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Computing r for each observation, I find that 75% of the observations have 
invalid r estimates (i.e., ACB 42 − < 0). The manipulators are more likely to have invalid 
values than the non-manipulators; that is, around 80% of the manipulators and 70% of the 
non-manipulators have invalid r estimates. This provides evidence that [i] the market is 
long-term efficient and it is, therefore, incorrect to equate intrinsic value estimate to 
contemporary price to solve for r in the short-run, and [ii] the intrinsic value estimates for 
the manipulators have less ability to measure firm value than those for the non-
manipulators. 
 
2.5.4. Reputation Effect 
 Companies may establish reputations, either for manipulation or non-




(consistent non-manipulators) or negative (consistent manipulators) reputations and the 
consequences of this reputation effect on firm valuation. 
 If a firm manipulated expectations in the previous year, the market will be more 
cautious about the accuracy of its forecasts in the current year. They will place less 
weight on these forecasts in security pricing. Consequently, the intrinsic value metric for 
repetitive manipulators (who manipulated in both the previous year and the current year 
and therefore have bad reputations) are expected to have lower ability to track stock price 
than intrinsic value metric for non-repetitive manipulators (who manipulated only in the 
current year). As in the main analyses, I assess stock tracking ability by [i] the cross-
sectional correlation between intrinsic value estima es and stock price and [ii] the 
stationarity (volatility and persistence) of the V/P time-series. 
 Table 7 reports the classification statistics of the manipulators and non-
manipulators in the current and prior years. Overall, 6,471 out of 24,691 firm-years 
(26.2%) are classified as manipulators in the current y ar. Of these 6,471 current-year 
manipulators, 1,418 (21.9%) manipulated forecasts in he prior year, and 3,488 (53.9%) 
did not manipulate forecasts in the prior year. Theremaining 1,565 (24.2%) current-year 
manipulators do not have sufficient data to be classified as manipulators or non-
manipulators in the prior year. Furthermore, of the 4,905 firm-years that manipulated 
forecasts in the prior year, 1,418 (28.9%) continue to manipulate forecasts in the current 
year and 3,487 firm-years (71.1%) do not manipulate for casts in the current year. This 
suggests that firms that manipulate in the current y ar are no more likely to manipulate in 




next examine the market reaction to the firms that do manipulate forecasts two years in a 
row. 
 I define repetitive manipulators (MM) to be the firm-years that are classified as 
manipulators in both the current year and the previous year. I define non-repetitive 
manipulators (MN) to be firm-years that are classified as manipulator in current year and 
non-manipulator in the previous year. I choose to use only one prior year to establish the 
reputation effect because there are very few firms that manipulate expectations three 
years in a row (in fact, only 447 firm-years, 1.81% of total firm-years, are manipulators 
for three consecutive years). To examine the reputation effect, I compare the 
performances of these two groups – repetitive manipulators (MM) and non-repetitive 
manipulators (MN) in the stock-tracking ability and returns predictability analyses. 
 
2.5.4.1. Cross-sectional Analysis 
 In this analysis, I compare the sample correlation between price and intrinsic 
value metrics for repetitive and non-repetitive manipulators. Consistent with the 
reputation effect, I predict that repetitive manipulators will have a lower sample 
correlation at the beginning of the year and a greate  decline in sample correlations 
throughout the year than non-repetitive manipulators. The result as reported in Table 8 
shows that, at the beginning of the year, MM has lower sample correlations than MN 
(0.53 versus 0.56); however, this difference of 0.03 is not statistically significant (with t = 
-0.23); furthermore, MM and MN both experience a signif cant decline of 0.06 in 




changes between the two groups is not statistically significant (with t = 0.19). Overall, 
these results do not provide evidence in support of the hypothesized reputation effect. 
 
2.5.4.2 Time-series Analysis 
 In this analysis, I compare the time-series properties of V/P ratios for repetitive 
and non-repetitive manipulators. Consistent with the reputation effect, I predict that 
intrinsic value estimates for repetitive manipulators yield V/P ratios with greater 
volatility (as measured by sample standard deviation) and greater persistence (as captured 
by the estimate of the first-order autoregressive coefficient) than intrinsic value metrics 
for non-repetitive manipulators. In Panels A and B of Table 9 I report the V/P ratios and 
standard deviations and AR1s for the V/P ratios for the repetitive manipulators and non-
manipulators respectively. In Panel C I report the differences in the sample standard 
deviations and the first-order autoregressive coeffici nt estimates for the two groups. As 
shown in Panel C, repetitive manipulators have higher sample standard deviations than 
non-repetitive manipulators (0.04 vs. 0.02) and this difference of 0.02 is statistically 
significant at the 5% level (with t = 3.68).  In contradiction to the prediction, the estimate 
of the first-order autoregressive statistic is larger in magnitude for the non-repetitive 
manipulators than the repetitive manipulators (0.30 versus 0.26), but this difference of -
0.04 is not statically significant at the 5% level (with t = -1.07). Therefore, the results 






2.5.4.3 Returns Analysis 
 In this returns test, I examine the return performance of MM and MN in the 12 
months subsequent to current year’s earnings announcement. I report the annual returns 
result and the cross-year averages of the returns fo  MM and MN in Table 10 Panel A 
and B for the manipulators and non-manipulators. The last row of these Panels 
summarizes the cross-year averages of returns. Panel C reports the difference in returns 
between the repetitive manipulators and non-repetitiv  manipulators. The t-statistic is 
computed from the standard errors of the annual statistics. As summarized in Panel C, the 
average V/P ratio portfolio return for the repetitive manipulators is -0.07 and that for the 
non-repetitive manipulators is 0.03. Comparing the returns performance of repetitive 
manipulator and non-repetitive manipulator subgroups with the returns performance for 
the overall manipulator group as reported in Table 5, we see that the repetitive 
manipulator subgroup earns similar returns to the overall manipulator group (-0.07 and    
-0.07), while the non-repetitive manipulator subgroup earns higher returns than the 
overall manipulator group (0.03 versus -0.07). The difference in portfolio returns for the 
repetitive and non-repetitive manipulators is 0.10, and this return difference is not 
statistically significant at the 5% level (with  = 0.68). These results therefore provide 
weak evidence in support of the hypothesized reputation effect. 
 In summary, the results from the stock-tracking ability test and the returns test 
provide, at best, only weak evidence in support of the hypothesized reputation effect that 








In this chapter, I first build on prior research to develop an improved measure for 
expectations management; I then examine the impact of expectations management on 
firm valuation. Specifically, I examine and compare th  performances of intrinsic value 
metrics estimated using manipulated versus non-manipulated forecasts to track stock 
price and predict future returns. Overall, the results suggest that, in the absence of 
expectations management, the market is long-term efficient and intrinsic value metrics 
represent good measures for firm value; consequently, i rinsic value metrics can identify 
short-term market mispricing and predict future retu ns through V/P ratios in the long-run 
when the market corrects its short-run mispricing. However, expectation management 
reduces the ability of intrinsic value metrics to identify stock mispricing and predict 
future returns through V/P ratios, but the market is efficient with respect to expectations 
management over the long-run, in the sense that it identifies and appropriately discounts 
for such manipulation. Consequently, V/P ratio portfolio strategies, where V is estimated 
using manipulated forecasts earns significantly lower return than the V/P ratio portfolio 
strategy, where V is estimated using non-manipulated forecasts. Taken together, these 
results provide evidence in support of the joint hypothesis of [i] long-term market 
efficiency with respect to expectations management and [ii] the negative impact of 










CHAPTER 3: THE IMPACT OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT ON 
THE USEFULNESS OF EARNINGS IN FIRM VALUATION 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Many empirical studies, such as Teoh et al. (1998) and Erickson and Wang (1998), 
have documented the existence and extent of earnings management; however, little 
research has been conducted to date to investigate he consequences and implications of 
such manipulation. Observing ever increasing earnings management activities and 
accounting scandals, the SEC has expressed the concrn that the pressure to meet 
earnings expectations may be eroding the quality of financial reporting. In this respect, 
Kasznik and McNichols (2002) call for inquiry into the consequences of management 
manipulation for firm valuation. In response to this, this chapter studies the impacts of 
earnings management on the usefulness of earnings in firm valuation.  
Earnings are often used in firm valuation by both the stock market and accounting 
valuation models. Earnings are useful because they capture truthful information relevant 
in assessing and predicting firm performance. However, firms’ deliberate earnings 
management activities may introduce errors into earnings and, thereby, reduce their 
ability to convey truthful information (Bernard, 1995). Earnings management reduces the 
usefulness of earnings and impairs the ability of accounting valuation models to predict 
firm value. The intrinsic value estimate will not be able to identify stock mispricing and 
predict future returns through a V/P-ratio portfolio strategy of buying under-priced stocks 




with respect to earnings management is an empirical ssue. If the market is efficient with 
respect to earnings management (i.e., it can identify and appropriately discount for such 
manipulation), then in light of earnings management, the stock price is a more accurate 
measure of firm value than the intrinsic value estima e from the accounting valuation 
model. On the other hand, if the stock market can not identify and appropriately discount 
for earnings manipulation, and is more adversely affected by management manipulation 
than the accounting valuation model, then in the presence of earnings management, the 
stock price represents a less accurate measure for firm value than the intrinsic value 
estimate from the accounting valuation model. To investigate which is actually the case, I 
examine the returns from the V/P-ratio portfolio strategies for the manipulator and non-
manipulator groups.  
 Results from the returns test show that the V/P ratio portfolio strategy for the non-
manipulators can earn a significant and positive return, while the V/P ratio portfolio 
strategy for the manipulators is not able to predict future returns. These results provide 
evidence that in absence of earnings management, th intrinsic value metrics estimated 
from the accounting valuation model represents a good measure of firm value – it can 
identify stock mispricing and predict future returns through V/P ratios. However, 
earnings management reduces the ability of the accounting valuation models to predict 
firm value, but it impairs the stock market to a less r extent. Consequently, in the 
presence of earnings management, the stock price repr s nts a more accurate measure for 
firm value than the intrinsic value metrics from the accounting valuation model. In 




impact of earnings management on the performance of accounting valuation models, and 
(2) the long-term market efficiency with respect to earnings management.  
  
 The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews related 
literature, Section 3.3 develops a measure for earnings management and presents the 
valuation model used to estimate intrinsic value metrics, Section 3.4 presents the 
empirical results on the impacts of earnings management on firm valuation, and Section 
3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2. Literature Review 
3.2.1. Earnings Management 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) state that “Earnings management occurs when managers 
use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance 
of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers.” 
It should be stressed that firms have many ways to manipulate earnings upward; for 
instance, they can use accounting discretion to [i] create income- increasing discretionary 
accruals (accrual manipulation) or [ii] take real economic steps, such as reducing 
discretionary spending on R&D, advertising, and maintenance, to boost earnings (real 
activity earnings management). Furthermore, there are multiple earnings benchmarks that 
firms attempt to achieve through earnings management. For instance, Burgstahler and 




decreases, and Degeorge et al. (1999) show that in addition to the positive earnings and 
positive earnings changes benchmarks, firms also manipulate earnings to meet or beat 
analyst expectations. It is therefore difficult (if not impossible) to use a single approach to 
capture all types of earnings management activities for all purposes. In this chapter, I 
design a specific measure to capture one particular type of earnings management for one 
particular purpose, which is accrual management to avoid reporting negative earnings. 
 
3.2.2. Usefulness of Earnings in Firm Valuation 
A survey paper by Graham et al. (2005) documents that CFOs believe that 
earnings, not cash flow, is the key metric considere  by outsiders. The explanation for the 
focus on EPS is that the world is complex and the number of available financial metrics is 
enormous. At the same time, investors need a simple etric to summarize corporate 
performance. In particular, this metric has to be easy to understand and relatively 
comparable across companies, and EPS satisfies these criteria. Consistent with this view, 
Skinner and Sloan (2002) report that, in the stock market, investors regard earnings as an 
important benchmark to evaluate firm performance and they tend to severely punish firms 
that fail to meet earnings benchmarks. 
In accounting research, earnings are also used as critical inputs to accounting 
valuation models. Residual income valuation models, such as Ohlson (1995), express 
firm value as a linear function of book value, residual earnings, and other information. 
Prior studies examining the empirical implementations f this model, in particular 
Dechow et al. (1999), show that the estimated intrinsic value metrics represent good 
measures for firm value; that is, they can identify potential stock mispricing and predict 




selling over-valued stocks. Earnings are useful in accounting valuation models because 
they can capture truthful information about firm performance. However, Bernard (1995) 
argues that one drawback of using earnings in valuation is that they contain “noise” and, 
being susceptible to management manipulation, they ma  not accurately reflect firms’ 
true performances.  
The above review suggests that earnings manipulation may introduce errors into 
earnings and thereby reduce the ability of these earnings numbers to reflect or predict 
firm performances; this in turn may diminish the abilities of the accounting valuation 
models to accurately predict firms’ intrinsic values. Therefore, I hypothesize that  
    H2: Earnings management introduces errors in earnings and reduces the usefulness of 
earnings in firm valuation; consequently, intrinsic value metrics estimated using 
manipulated earnings will have less ability to predict firm value. 
 
3.3. Research Design 
In this section, I develop the measure for earnings management and present the 
process used to estimate intrinsic value metrics from the Ohlson (1995) residual income 
valuation model. 
 
3.3.1. Development of the Earnings Management Measure 
The accounting literature has used three approaches to measure earnings 
management. These are: (i) the aggregate accrual approach (e.g., Jones, 1991); (ii) the 
specific accrual approach (e.g., McNichols and Wilson, 1988); and (iii) the distribution of 




accrual approach, total accruals are regressed on selected nondiscretionary variables and 
the residual is taken as an estimate of discretionary accruals. This approach allows us to 
measure the magnitude of earnings management that arises from manipulation of all 
accrual accounts; however, the power of these aggregate models to find manipulation has 
been shown to be dismally low (e.g., Bernard and Skinner, 1996). The specific accrual 
approach focuses on specific industry or contextual settings where one or more accruals 
tend to be sizable. It detects earnings management through a particular accrual account, 
rather than aggregating all manipulated accruals. The distribution of earnings after 
management approach focuses on the behaviour of earnings around a specified 
benchmark and tests whether the instances of amounts above and below the benchmark 
are distributed smoothly or whether it simply reflects discontinuities due to the exercise 
of discretion. This is a powerful tool for identifying contexts in which large numbers of 
firms appear to manage earnings. However, it is silent on the magnitude of manipulation 
at an individual firm-year/quarter level. Furthermore, it uses an imprecise benchmark 
(i.e., whether earnings are slightly above earnings thresholds) to identify firms that 
manipulate earnings. In this study, I build on the aggregate accrual approach and the 
distribution of earnings after management approach to develop a measure of earnings 
management. I then validate the measure using both the total accrual approach the 
specific accrual approach. Specifically, to develop the measure I first use the aggregate 
accrual approach to compute discretionary accruals; I then use the distribution of earnings 





To facilitate the development and testing of the earnings management measure 
and ensure that I do not exhaust my entire sample in the process, as in Chapter 2, I first 
partition the sample into two sub-samples. These are the validation sample and the test 
sample. I then use the validation sample to develop and test my earnings management 
measure and the test sample to carry out my main anlyses. In the next sub-section, I 
present the sample statistics; and in the subsequent s b-sections, I describe the procedure 
used to develop and test the earnings management measure. 
 
3.3.1.1. Sample Statistics 
 The population consists of all U.S. firms that have data on Compustat for the time 
period from 1983 to 2006. First, I randomly select 20% of the total firms and use them as 
the validation sample to develop the earnings management measure. I then use the 
remaining 80% of the firms as the test sample to conduct the main analyses. I use firms 
instead of firm-years to create the test and validation sample because estimating the 
forward-looking modified Jones model on the validation sample requires firms to have 
lagged accruals. If I randomly select 20% of the firm-years as the validation sample, then 
many of the lagged firm-years will not be in the valid tion sample. The unavailability of 
the lagged accrual data in the validation sample wil result in a substantial reduction in 
the sample size. Using firms, instead of firm-years, to create the test and validation 
sample avoids this problem. The number of firms, firm-years, industries, and industry-
years in the test and validation samples are reportd in Table 11. To determine whether 
the randomization process is successful (i.e., whether the generated test and validation 




validation samples and plot these distributions in Figure 2. As shown in the figure, the 
test and validation samples have similar industry and year distributions. 
 
3.3.1.2. Estimation of Discretionary Accruals 
Earlier studies, such as Matsumoto (2002) and Bartov et al. (2002), use the Modified 
Jones models to estimate discretionary accruals to examine the impacts of earnings 
management on MBE. Dechow et al. (2003) propose a so-called forward-looking 
modified Jones (FLMJ) model and demonstrate that this model outperforms the Jones and 
Modified Jones models in capturing discretionary accruals. In this section, I first 
implement the FLMJ model on the validation sample. I then compare the estimation of 
the FLMJ model with the estimations of other Jones-type models. The FLMJ model is 
specified as follows: 
 
tititiit GPPEARsalesk =Accrual ,2,,1 ))1(( ββα +∆−∆++  
                     ititit SalesGrAccrual εββ +++ +− 1413 _           (3.1) 
where Accrualit is firm i’s total accruals from year t,  
Salesit∆ is the change in firm i’s sales revenue (Compustat data item #12) from year t-1 
to t, ARit∆ is the change in firm i’s accounts receivable from operating activities from year 
t-1 to t (Compustat data item #302), GPPEit is firm i’s year t gross property plant and 
equipment – land excluded (Compustat data item #7); and 1_ +itSalesGR  is the change in 




Hribar and Collins (2002) show that the balance-sheet method may produce 
substantial errors in accrual estimation. Therefore, I use the cash-flow statement approach 
to calculateAccrualit by subtracting its operating cash flows from its net i come: 
            Ait =  EBEIit − CFOit                                                 (3.2) 
where itEBEI  is firm i’s income before extraordinary items in year t (Compustat item 
#123), itCFO is firm i’s cash flows from operations in year t (Compustat item #308). 
 The coefficient k in (3.1) is estimated from the r gression 
                             ζ ititit  + Salesk + a = AR ∆∆                                           (3.3) 
by ordinary least squares (OLS), where the slope coeffi ient (k) in (3.3) represents the 
expected changes in account receivables for a given on -unit change in sales, and   
ζ it  is a zero-mean error term. I then use the OLS estimate of the slope coefficient to 
construct the unexpected portion of the change in account receivable due to the change in 
sales in (3.1) as (1+ k)∆Salesit − ∆ARit . 
Setting 043 ==== ββka  reduces (3.1) to the Modified Jones model proposed by 
Dechow et al. (1995), and if, in addition,Salesit∆ is left unsubtracted from ∆ARit , then I 
obtain the original Jones (1991) model. In other wods, the FLMJ model includes three 
adjustments to the MJ model. First, rather than assuming all credit sales are discretionary, 
the model treats part of the increase in credit sales s expected by regressing ∆ARit  on 
∆Salesit . Second, a portion of total accruals is assumed to be predictable and captured by 
including last year’s accruals (i.e., lagged total accruals) in the model. Third, the 
Modified Jones model treats increases in inventory made in anticipation of higher sales as 




inventory. Including future sales growth corrects for such misclassifications; however, it 
means that the FLMJ model uses future period data to estimate current period normal and 
abnormal accruals.  
Table 12 summarizes the sample statistics for estimating the FLMJ model on the 
validation sample. The data used to estimate the model are obtained from the Compustat 
Industry Annual file. I use the cash flow statement approach to calculate accruals. The 
data required to compute accruals in the cash flow approach restrict the sample to a 
period from 1988 to 2006, because Compustat did not start to report these cash flow 
statement data until 1987 and the FLMJ model requirs data on lagged accruals. As in 
Richardson et al. (1999), I exclude firms in financial and regulated industries (SIC code 
4400-5000 and 6000-6999) because their accounting rules differ from those of firms in 
other industries. To estimate k for each industry-year, I delete industry-years that have 
fewer than 10 firm-year observations.  
I compare the estimation of the FLMJ model in my study and Dechow et al. (2003) 
in Panel A of Table 13. The sample used in Dechow et al. (2003) spans from 1988 to 
2000, whereas my study extends the sample period to 2006. The estimated k and estimate 
coefficients for the non-discretionary variables are similar to those reported in Dechow et 
al. (2003). The adjusted R-square is slightly higher in my study than in Dechow et al. 
(0.253 versus 0.200) as expected since I have a longer sample for estimation. Next, I 
compute discretionary accruals as the difference between total accrual and estimated non-
discretionary accruals, ititit NDAADA −= , where itNDA is calculated as the predicted 




To justify my choice of the FLMJ model over the other Jones-type models on 
statistical ground, I estimate other versions of the Jones-type models and compare the 
performance of the FLMJ model to the performances of the other models. Specifically, I 
first examine whether the estimated coefficients are consistent with the theoretical 
predictions in terms of expected signs. I then follow Dechow et al. (2003) to compare 
model performance using the values of the adjusted R-square. The rationale for this 
strategy is that, in the Jones-type models, we regress total accruals on variables 
representing non-discretionary accruals and use the predicted residual from the model as 
a measure for discretionary accruals; however, this predicted residual may capture some 
non-discretionary accruals that are omitted from the model. Therefore, by including more 
non-discretionary accrual variables in the model, w can improve the explanatory power 
of the model and, in the process, reduce the extent of the measurement error contained in 
the discretionary accrual proxy.  
The alternative models I estimate include the modifie  Jones model, the lagged 
Modified Jones model, and the FLMJ model without the sales growth variable. These 
models are specified as follows: 
 
Modified Jones Model: 
 
        titititiit GPPEARsales =Accrual ,,2,,1 )( εββα ++∆−∆+                    (3.4) 
 
Lagged Modified Jones Model: 
 
 tititititiit AccrualGPPEARsales =Accrual ,1,3,2,,1 )( εβββα +++∆−∆+ −        (3.5) 
 





tititititiit AccrualGPPEARsalesk =Accrual ,1,3,2,,1 ))1(( εβββα +++∆−∆++ −      (3.6) 
 
The results, as shown in Panel B of Table 13, suggest that all of the models 
produce estimated coefficients with correct signs ad have magnitudes similar to those 
reported in prior studies. Notably, the FLMJ model produces the highest value of the 
adjusted R-square (= 0.253) and the “FLMJ model withou  sales growth component” 
ranks second with an adjusted R-square value of 0.230.  
As can be seen from (3.1), Dechow et al. (2003) add future sales growth to the Jones 
model in order to control for variation in normal accruals. The rationale for this inclusion 
is that firms anticipating sales growth will rationally increase inventory balances. 
However, there is a problem with using the actual sales changes in period t+1 as a proxy 
for the expected growth. In particular, the objective of constructing an accrual model in 
my study is to examine the implications of earnings management for valuation. As Healy 
(1995) points out, the integration of any information that becomes known only in future 
periods would make the model useless for ex ante analysis and so, for timely valuation. 
So the use of variables with values that become known only in the future undermines the 
practical usefulness of the model. Therefore, in this study I choose to use the FLMJ 
model without the sales growth variable to estimate discretionary accruals.  
Firms with unusual performance are expected to haveextr me accruals (see 
Kothari, et al., 2005). I follow the performance-matching methodolgy described in 
Kothari et al. (2005) to control for the impact of performance on estimated discretionary 
accruals. Specifically, I match each firm-year with another firm-year that is in the same 
industry and year and has the closest ROA to the firm-year in question. I then adjust the 




The performance-adjusted discretionary accrual estimates (referred to hereafter as DA) 
have a mean of -0.002 and a median of -0.001 across all firms and years. 
 
3.3.1.3. Validation: Use of DA to Identify Extreme Earnings Manipulators 
In this section, I validate the ability of performance-matched DA (or DA for short) to 
identify extreme earnings manipulators. Specifically, I examine whether DA can be used 
to identify firms that are targeted by SEC for earnings overstatement. To implement the 
test, I assign firm-years into DA deciles and examine the distribution of GAAP violators 
in the DA deciles. Firms create positive discretionary accruals to manage earnings up; 
therefore, if the discretionary accrual approach is capable of identifying extreme earnings 
manipulators, I would expect the SEC-GAAP violators to be concentrated in the top 
deciles of the DA distribution. Although prior studies, such as Dechow et al. (1995), also 
use GAAP violators to examine their discretionary accrual estimates, none of these 
studies use the same model (which is the FLMJ model mitting the future sales growth 
variable) as the one used in this study. Therefore, it is important to perform this 
validation in my study. 
To construct the list of SEC GAAP violators, I combine the list of firms that were 
subjected to SEC enforcement actions for earnings overstatement for the period 1992-
2001 from Erickson et al. (2004) and for the period 1994-2003 from Lane and O’Connell 
(2006). This results in 95 firms. I then use the online WRDS name search tool to identify 
the GVKEY for each GAAP violator. Out of these 95 firms, 76 firms and 191 firm-years 
have valid GVKEY values. Out of these 76 firms and 191 firm-years, 14 firms and 34 




In Table 14, I report the distribution of these 34 GAAP violators in the DA deciles. 
Contrary to my prior expectation, I find no evidenc of a concentrated distribution of 
GAAP violators in the top DA deciles. This result suggests that the DA measure 
estimated from the performance-adjusted FLMJ model do s not have enough power to 
identify extreme earnings manipulators (GAAP violatrs).  
To measure earnings management more accurately, in the ext step I focus on a 
particular type of earnings management for a particular purpose, which is accrual 
manipulation for the purpose of avoiding negative earnings. This aligns my research on 
earnings management with my research on expectations ma agement, which also focuses 
on benchmark-beating behaviour. Accordingly, I narrow the research question to 
“examining the impact of loss-avoidance accrual management on firm valuation”. 
Specifically, I examine how this type of earnings management impacts the abilities of 
accounting valuation models to predict firms’ true intrinsic values. 
In the next section, I use discretionary accrual estimates to identify firms that 
manipulate accruals to meet the positive earnings benchmark, following the “distribution 
of earnings after management approach”. In the subsequent section, I present a validation 
test for the ability of the proposed measure to capture the notion of earnings management. 
 
3.3.1.4. Definition of Earnings Manipulators and Non-manipulators 
Prior studies, such as Matsumoto (2002), define earnings manipulators to be the 
firm-years with positive DA and non-manipulators to be those with negative DA. 




manipulation, defining firm-years with positive DA as manipulators may misclassify 
many firm-years.  
To avoid this pitfall, I use DA together with the zro-earnings benchmark to identify 
firms that are likely to have manipulated earnings for the purpose of avoiding negative 
earnings. Firms are motivated to report positive earnings to avoid punishment by the 
stock market (see Skinner and Sloan, 1999), to maxiize management’s bonus 
compensation (see Healy, 1995) and to enhance reputations with stakeholders (see 
Bowen et al., 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). One approach they take to achieve 
the positive earnings benchmark is to create income-incr asing discretionary accruals. 
Therefore, I define earnings manipulators to be the firm-years whose earnings before 
discretionary accruals are less than zero and whose earnings after discretionary accruals 
are greater than zero. Since these firms are likely to have created income-increasing 
discretionary accruals to avoid reporting negative earnings, I refer to them as loss-
avoidance accrual manipulators. In this context, “earnings” are measured using earnings 
before extraordinary items and “discretionary accrual” is the performance-adjusted 
discretionary accrual estimated from the FLMJ model.  
As a next step, I construct a matched non-manipulator control sample. To do so, I 
first create a group of firms-years that have earnings before and after discretionary 
accrual both greater than zero. Since these firms do not need to manipulate accruals in 
order to produce positive earnings, I refer to them as non-manipulators. Finally, to 
construct the matched non-manipulator control sample, I match each firm-year in the 
manipulator group with another firm-year in the non-manipulator group that is in the 




the firm-year in question. Note that I previously matched each firm-year with another 
firm-year based on industry, year and ROA to construct performance-adjusted 
discretionary accruals. The purpose of that match was to control for the impact of 
performance on the magnitude of DA at the firm-year l vel. I now perform another match 
to construct the control sample. The purpose of this particular match is to control for 
group differences in aspects other than accrual manipulation to ensure that the results we 
observe later are due to manipulation rather than to differences between the two groups in 
other aspects. These two matches are not redundant and are both necessary to adequately 
control for confounding factors and alternative explanations. 
 
3.3.1.5. Validation of the Earnings Management Measure 
To validate the ability of this measure to capture the notion of earnings management, 
I use the validation sample to examine whether the classified manipulators have higher 
deferred tax expense (DTE) and special items than te matched non-manipulators. Philips 
et al. (2002) propose to use the DTE to detect earnings management. The argument for 
this is that the DTE is a component of a firm’s total income tax expense. As such, it 
reflects the tax effects of temporary differences btween book income and taxable income 
that arise primarily from accruals for revenue and expense items that affect book income 
and taxable income in different periods. Managers typically have more discretion under 
GAAP than under U.S. tax rules. If managers manage e rnings upwards, they are 
expected to use their discretion under the GAAP in ways that do not affect current 




differences that increase the DTE.3 This argument suggests that the DTE is expected to 
be higher for earnings manipulators than for non-manipulators. The classified 
manipulators are also expected to have higher special items because prior studies, such as 
Marquardt and Wiedman (2002), have found that firms manage earnings through special 
items to avoid reporting losses and earnings decreases. In Table 15, it is clear that 
manipulators have significantly higher DTE and special items than non-manipulators. 
These results provide evidence in support of my classification of accrual manipulators 
and non-manipulators. 
 
3.3.2. Estimation of Intrinsic Value Metrics from Ohlson (1995) 
 As in the expectations management chapter, I use Ohlson’s (1995) model as the 
valuation framework to estimate intrinsic value metrics. Specifically, I construct the 
intrinsic value metric for each firm-year observation at the earnings announcement date, 
using the announced earnings, the book value, and the consensus analyst forecast issued 
by IBES in the earnings announcement month. I obtain the stock price at the same time to 
construct the intrinsic value-to-price (V/P) ratio. 
 
3.4. Empirical Analyses 
In this section, I first construct the earnings management measure and intrinsic value 
metrics on the test sample. I then conduct two empirical analyses to examine the impacts 
                                                
3 DTE is measured by a firm’s deferred tax expense (Compustat data item #50) in year t, scaled by total 
assets (Compustat data item #6) in year t-1. DTE is a variable in change form derived from changes in 
balance sheet accounts, and is unlikely to follow a random walk. If managers engage in earnings 
management to increase earnings but not taxable income then, regardless of how the target is defined, such 
earnings management generates book-tax differences that result in a higher DTE than would be observed in 
the absence of such activity. Thus, the level of DTE, not the change in DTE, is the appropriate variable 




of loss-avoidance accrual manipulation on the ability of accounting valuation models to 
predict firm value. 
 
3.4.1. Sample Statistics 
3.4.1.1. Estimation of the Intrinsic Value Metrics in the Test Sample 
 In this section, I implement Ohlson’s (1995) valuation model using the test 
sample to obtain an intrinsic value estimate for each firm-year in this sample. The sample 
statistics for the estimation process are presented i  Panel A of Table 16. Specifically, I 
first exclude firms in the financial and regulated in ustries. I then match the sample to 
CRSP and IBES. This reduces the sample to 7,853 firms and 179,148 firm-years. 
Obtaining book value and earnings data reduces the ample to 7,419 firms and 76,419 
firm-years. Requiring analyst one-year-ahead earnings forecast data further reduces the 
sample to 6,398 firms and 49,296 firm-years. I then estimate the intrinsic value metrics 
for each firm -year observation at the earnings annou cement date. The estimation 
process is detailed in Section 3.3.2. The data requir ment for intrinsic value metrics 
further reduces the sample to 5,845 firms and 37,701 firm-years. 
 
3.4.1.2. Definition of Accrual Manipulators and Non-manipulators 
I use the test sample to estimate the FLMJ model for each firm-year observation at 
the earnings announcement date. I report the sample selection process in Panel B of Table 
16. As shown in the table, firms in the financial and regulated industries are eliminated. 
Obtaining necessary data to construct each variable n the FLMJ model reduces the 




model requires at least 10 firm-year observations fr each industry-year. Excluding 
industry-years with fewer than 10 firm-year observations further reduces the sample to 
8,421 firms and 60,110 firm-years. Therefore, the sample with valid discretionary accrual 
estimates consists of 8,421 firms and 60,110 firm-years from 43 industries and 719 
industry-years.  
I then merge the sample of discretionary accruals with the sample of intrinsic value 
estimates by firm-year to create the final sample of loss-avoidance accrual manipulators 
and non-manipulators. As reported in Panel C of Table 16, there are more industries and 
industry-years in the intrinsic value sample than in the discretionary accrual sample. This 
is because I have deleted industries (industry years) with fewer than 10 firm-year 
observations from the discretionary accrual sample, but not from the intrinsic value 
sample; furthermore, there are more firms and firm-years in the discretionary accrual 
sample than in the intrinsic value sample. This is because the intrinsic value measure has 
a stricter data requirement (i.e., lagged and twice lagged book values) than the 
discretionary accrual measure. Consequently, merging the discretionary accrual and 
intrinsic value samples significantly reduces the sample to 4,915 firms and 29,241 firm-
years. I then construct the loss-avoidance accrual manipulator sample and non-
manipulator sample in the process as detailed earlier. This results in 4,721firm-years in 
the manipulator sample and 4,721 matched firm-years in the non-manipulator sample. I 
use the combined manipulator and non-manipulator sample of 3,170 firms and 9,442 firm 
years in the first empirical analysis to examine and compare the price (P), intrinsic value 




firms and 3,014 firm-years that report earnings in February as the sample in the returns 
analysis. 
 
3.4.1.3. Statistics for the merged earnings manipulators and expectations 
manipulators sample 
To provide insight into how the earnings manipulators and expectations 
manipulators relate to each other, in this section, I examine the statistics for the 
expectations management sample (firm-years with valid expectations management 
measures), the earnings management sample (firm-years with valid earnings management 
measures), and the joint sample (firm-years with bot  valid earnings management and 
valid expectations management measures). For each sample, I compute the percentages 
of manipulators and non-manipulators.  Table 17 reports the yearly sample statistics. The 
last row of this table summarizes the statistics for the total sample across all years.  
The expectations management sample consists of non-fi a cial and non-regulated 
U.S. firms that have the necessary analyst forecast data to construct the expectations 
management measure. As shown in the last row of Table 17, across all years this sample 
includes 30,241firm-year observations, 27% of which are classified as expectations 
manipulators. The earnings management sample consists of non-financial and non-
regulated U.S. firms that have required accounting data (e.g., earnings, sales, account 
receivable, etc.) to construct the earnings management easure. This sample includes 
60,110 firm-year observations, 16.0% of which are classified as earnings manipulators. I 
then merge these two samples to construct a sample with both earnings management and 
expectations management measures.  There is a significant sample reduction by merging 




different data requirement; therefore, the overlap of these two samples are relative small. 
As shown in the last row of Table 17, the merged sample includes 20,101 firm-year 
observations. Out of these 20,101 observations, 5,176 (or 27%) are classified as 
expectations manipulators and 3,382 (or 17%) are classified as earnings manipulators. 
Out of the 5,176 expectations manipulators, 18% are cl ssified as earnings manipulators. 
This is similar to the proportion of earnings manipulators in the overall sample (17% 
versus 18%, with a t-statistic of 0.44). Out of the3,382 earnings manipulators, 28% are 
classified as expectations manipulators. Again, this is similar to the proportion of 
expectations manipulators in the overall sample (27% versus 28%, with a t-statistic of 
0.76).  
In summary, the results in this table suggest that firms are more likely to 
manipulate expectations than they are to manipulate e rnings (27% versus 16%, with a t-
statistic of 3.86). Earnings manipulators and firm-years in the overall sample have similar 
probabilities of being expectations manipulators (28% versus 27%, with a t-statistics of 
0.76). Similarly, expectations manipulators and firm-years in the overall sample have 
similar probabilities of being earnings manipulators (18% versus 17%, with a t-statistics 
of 0.44). 
 
3.4.2. Empirical Analyses 
In this section, I examine the impact of loss-avoidance accrual manipulation on the 
usefulness of earnings in accounting valuation models. As detailed in Chapter 2, the 
assumption about the extent of market efficiency has important implications on the 




long-term efficient. Specifically, stocks can be mispr ced in the short-run, but price will 
converge to the true intrinsic value over the course of a few months. Under this condition, 
good intrinsic value metrics should be able to identify short-term mispricing and predict 
future returns through V/P ratios; furthermore, if earnings management impairs the ability 
of valuation models to predict firm value, then I should observe that intrinsic value 
metrics estimated using manipulated earnings will have less ability to predict future 
returns.  
In Section 3.4.2.1, I compare stock prices, intrinsic value estimates, and V/P ratios 
for the manipulators and non-manipulator to see if the market recognizes and discounts 
for earnings manipulation. In Section 3.4.2.2, I use the V/P ratio portfolio strategy returns 
analysis to further examine whether earnings management impairs the ability of 
accounting valuation models to predict firm value. Consistent with hypothesis 2, I expect 
the V/P ratio portfolio strategy for the manipulators to have less ability to predict future 
returns than the V/P ratio portfolio strategy for the non-manipulators.  
 
 
3.4.2.1. V, P, and V/P Ratio Comparisons: Manipulators vs. Non-manipulators 
In Table 18, I compare manipulators and non-manipulators with respect to stock 
price, intrinsic value estimate, and V/P ratio in the year of manipulation and the year 
prior to manipulation. Stock price (P) for the manipulators is lower than that for the non-
manipulators (16.84 vs. 18.80), and this difference of -1.97 is statistically significant at 
the 1% level (with a sample t-statistic of -4.39); the estimated intrinsic value (V) for the 
manipulators is slightly higher than that for the non-manipulators (10.79 vs. 10.39) and 




1.78). As a result, the V/P ratio for the manipulators is significantly higher than that for 
the non-manipulators (0.89 versus 0.74) and this difference of 0.14 is statistically 
significant at the 1% level (with t = 8.37). To ensure that these group differences are due 
to accrual manipulation rather than other firm-specific factors, I examine V, P, and the 
V/P ratio for the two groups in the year prior to earnings manipulation. The rationale for 
this exercise is that if the V/P differences are duto firm-specific characteristics other 
than earnings management, then this difference as observed in the manipulation year 
should persist in years other than the manipulation year. As shown in Table 18, the 
pattern observed in the manipulation year does not hold in the year prior to manipulation. 
Specifically, although the intrinsic value estimate for the manipulators in the prior year is 
higher than that for the non-manipulators (10.35 versus 9.72) as it is in the manipulation 
year; the stock price for the manipulators in the prior year is actually higher than that for 
the non-manipulators (16.41 versus 16.14) and this difference is not statistically 
significant (with t = 0.51). Furthermore, the difference in V/P ratios between 
manipulators and non-manipulators in the prior year is much smaller in magnitude (0.05) 
and is not statistically significant at a 5% level (with t = 1.64). This suggests that the 
significantly lower price, slightly higher intrinsic value estimate and significantly higher 
V/P ratio for the manipulators in the manipulation year is more likely to be due to accrual 
manipulation than to differences in other aspects be ween the two groups. Thus, it seems 
that the market does recognize and discount for accru l manipulation. However, it is 
unclear whether the price discount for the manipulators is appropriate and whether 
intrinsic value metrics estimated using manipulated earnings still represent good 




abilities of the V/P ratio portfolio strategies for the manipulators and non-manipulators to 
predict future returns. 
 
3.4.2.2. V/P ratio Portfolio Strategy Returns Test 
The rationale for the returns test is that, assuming that the market is long-term 
efficient and that it takes a few months for price to converge to the true value, a good 
intrinsic value metric should be able to identify potential stock mispricing and predict 
future returns through V/P ratios. Furthermore, if loss-avoidance accrual manipulation 
impairs the ability of the accounting valuation model to predict firms’ intrinsic values, 
and if it does not affect the ability of the stock market to predict firm values to the same 
extent, in the sense that the stock market can identify and discount for such manipulation 
appropriately, then the V/P ratio portfolio strategy, where V is estimated using 
manipulated earnings, is expected to have less ability to identify stock mispricing and 
predict future returns than the V/P ratio portfolio strategy, where V is estimated using 
non-manipulated earnings.  
Frankel and Lee (1998) estimate the intrinsic value metrics using analyst forecast-
based residual income valuation model and then examine the returns to the V/P ratio 
portfolio strategies over the 12-, 24-, and 36-months returns windows. They find 
significant positive returns from the V/P ratio strategies, especially over longer return 
windows. However, Beaver (2002), Kothari (2001), and Lo and Lys (2000) express the 
concern that high V/P firms may have higher risks and, therefore, the returns from the 
V/P ratio portfolio strategy may be caused by uncontrolled risks. To address the 




non-manipulator groups are due to differences in risks between the two groups, I use the 
calendar-time approach Fama and French returns regression to control for risks and 
obtain risk-adjusted returns. I then compare these risk-adjusted returns between the two 
manipulation groups. Although Frankel and Lee (1998) generally find stronger returns 
performance over longer time periods, I use a 12-month return window, because my 
classification of manipulator and non-manipulator is an annual event. Therefore, the 
classification holds for 12 months only. At the end of the 12th month there will be 
reclassification and prior manipulators may be reclassified as non-manipulators and vice-
versa.  
To ensure that the sample firm-years are aligned in calendar time, I use the 1,299 
firms and 3,014 firm-years that report earnings in February as my sample. I choose to use 
February, because compared to other months it has the most firms reporting. To 
implement the strategy, for each manipulation group in February of each year, I rank 
firms by V/P ratio and partition them into quintiles. I then obtain the monthly returns for 
each firm for the next 12 months. For each manipulation group, I compute the average 
monthly return for each V/P quintile (Retm,t
Qn). Specifically, Retm,t
Q5_M  represents the 
average monthly return to the top V/P quintile for the manipulator group in month m of 
year t; Retm,t
Q1_M represents the average monthly return to the bottom V/P quintile for the 
manipulator group in month m of year t; Retm,t
Q5 _N  represents the average monthly return 
to the top V/P quintile for the non-manipulator group in month m of year t; 
andRetm,t
Q1_N represents the average monthly return to the bottom V/P quintile for the non-




 I obtain the Fama and French risk factors and the momentum factor from the “Fama-
French, Momentum, and Liquidity” dataset on the WRDS database. I then regress the 
monthly returns for the top and bottom V/P quintiles for each manipulation group on the 
risk factors as follows: 
  Retm,t
Q5 _M = αm,t
Q5_M + β1MktRFm,t + β2SMBm,t + β3HMLm,t + β4UMDm,t + εm,t
Q5 _M    (3.7) 
   Retm,t
Q1_M = αm,t
Q1_M + β1MktRFm,t + β2SMBm,t + β3HMLm,t + β4UMDm,t + εm,t
Q1_M     (3.8) 
Retm,t
Q5 _N = αm,t
Q5 _N + β1MktRFm,t + β2SMBm,t + β3HMLm,t + β4UMDm,t + εm,t
Q5_N     (3.9) 
Retm,t
Q1_N = αm,t
Q1_N + β1MktRFm,t + β2SMBm,t + β3HMLm,t + β4UMDm,t + εm,t
Q1_N     (3.10) 
 
where tmMktRF , is the value weighted monthly return to the Center for Research in 
Security Prices universe less the return on a one-month treasury bill, tmSMB , is the return 
to small stocks less the return on big stocks, tmHML , is the return to high book-to-market 
equity stocks less the return on low book-to-market equity stocks, and tmUMD , is the 
return on high past return stocks (winners) minus the return on low past return stocks 
(losers).  






~α as the risk-adjusted monthly quintile 
returns to the top and bottom V/P quintiles for the non-manipulator group. I then compute 
the risk-adjusted V/P ratio hedged portfolio return as the difference in the risk-adjusted 






~α ). The t-statistics on 
the hedged portfolio returns are computed using the means and standard deviations of the 
two quintile returns. I report these risk-adjusted quintile returns and hedged-portfolio 




Results on the individual quintile returns show that, for the non-manipulator group, 
the top V/P quintile is able to earn a significant positive return of 0.009 (with t = 2.78), 
while the return to the bottom V/P quintile is 0.005 and is not statistically significant at a 
5% level (with t = 1.34). The hedge portfolio return, which is the difference in the risk-
adjusted returns between the top and bottom V/P quintiles, is 0.004, and this return is 
statistically significant at a 5% level (with  = 3.17). This provides evidence for the ability 
of the intrinsic value metrics for the non-manipulators to identify stock mispricing and 
predict future returns through V/P ratios. In contras , for the manipulator group, both the 
top and bottom V/P quintiles are unable to earn abnormal returns after controlling for 
risks; that is, the abnormal returns of 0.004 and 0.003 are statistically insignificant at a 
5% level (with t = 1.24 and t = 1.02 respectively). The difference in risk-adjusted returns 
between the top and bottom V/P quintiles is quantittively small (0.001) and statistically 
insignificant (with t = 0.74), providing evidence that for the manipulators, the V/P ratio 
portfolio strategy of buying firms in the top V/P quintile and selling firms in the bottom 
V/P quintile is not able to earn a significant retun.  
In summary, these returns results suggest that, in the absence of earnings 
management, the market is long-term efficient and intrinsic value metrics are good 
measures of firm value; consequently, intrinsic value metrics can identify short-term 
market mispricing and predict future returns through V/P ratios in the long-run when the 
market corrects its short-run mispricing. However, earnings management reduces the 
ability of intrinsic value metrics to identify stock mispricing and predict future returns 
through V/P ratios, but the market is efficient with respect to earnings management over 




Consequently, V/P ratio portfolio strategies where V is estimated using manipulated 
earnings, have significantly lower returns than the V/P ratio portfolio strategy, where V is 
estimated using non-manipulated earnings. Overall, these results provide evidence in 
support of the joint hypothesis of [i] long-term market efficiency with respect to earnings 
management and [ii] the negative impact of earnings management on the usefulness of 
earnings in accounting valuation models. 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I examine the impacts of earnings management on the ability of 
accounting valuation models to predict firm value. I first combine the aggregate accrual 
approach and the distribution of earnings after management approach to develop a 
measure that focuses on accrual manipulation to achieve positive earnings. I use this 
measure to identify firms that manipulate accruals to avoid reporting losses. I then create 
a matched sample of non-manipulators with earnings before and after discretionary 
accrual both greater than zero and matched to the manipulator group based on firm size, 
industry and year. I use the Ohlson (1995) model as a valuation framework to estimate 
intrinsic value metrics. I then examine how loss-avoidance accrual manipulation 
influences the performance of intrinsic value metrics to predict firm value. 
My empirical results suggest that in the year prior to the earnings manipulation, stock 
price and V/P ratios are similar for accrual manipulators and non-manipulators. However, 
in the year of accrual manipulation, stock price become significantly lower and V/P ratio 
becomes significantly higher for the manipulators than for the non-manipulators. This 




further investigate whether the price discount is appropriate and whether the intrinsic 
value metrics are still good measure for firm value in the presence of earnings 
management, I examine and compare the performances of the V/P ratio portfolio 
strategies for the manipulators and non-manipulators to predict future returns. 
I use the calendar-time approach Fama and French returns regression to obtain risk-
adjusted V/P quintile returns and then compute the V/P ratio portfolio returns for the 
manipulator group and non-manipulator group separately. I find that the returns to the 
V/P ratio portfolio strategy for the non-manipulator group are positive and statistically 
significant, providing evidence in favour of long-term market efficiency and the ability of 
intrinsic value metrics estimated using non-manipulated earnings to identify stock 
mispricing and predict future returns. However, the return to the V/P ratio portfolio 
strategy for the manipulator group is quantitatively small and statistically insignificant 
after controlling for risks. This suggests that the intrinsic value metrics estimated using 
manipulated earnings are no longer able to identify s ock mispricing and predict future 
returns through V/P ratios. Overall, these results provide evidence in support of the joint 
hypothesis of [i] long-term market efficiency, and [ii] the negative impact of earnings 
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Figure 1: Monthly Cross-Sectional Sample Correlations between Price and Intrinsic 
Value Estimates – Manipulators vs. Non-manipulators 
 
For each manipulation group in each year t, I compute monthly sample correlations 
between price and intrinsic value estimate at the end of each month m. Intrinsic value 
metrics are estimated using two alternative risk premiums: 3% and 8%. Panel A of this 
table reports and plots the monthly sample correlations between price and intrinsic value 
estimate, where the intrinsic value is estimated using 3% risk premium, and Panel B plots 
the monthly correlations between price and intrinsic value estimate, where the intrinsic 
value is estimated using 8% risk premium. 
 
 
Panel A: Monthly Sample Correlations between V and P, where V is Estimated using 3%  
Risk Premium 
 
Correlation Mon1 Mon2 Mon3 Mon4 Mon5 Mon6 Mon7 Mon8 Mon9 Mon10 Mon11 Mon12 
non-
manipulator 0.539 
0.535 0.555 0.546 0.539 0.553 0.554 0.542 0.552 0.559 0.550 0.552 






















Panel B: Monthly Sample Correlations between V and P, where V is Estimated using 8% 
Risk Premium 
 
Correlation Mon1 Mon2 Mon3 Mon4 Mon5 Mon6 Mon7 Mon8 Mon9 Mon10 Mon11 Mon12 
non-
manipulator 0.538 
0.536 0.555 0.545 0.537 0.553 0.554 0.543 0.553 0.559 0.551 0.552 























Figure 2: Industry and Fiscal Year Distributions in the Earnings Management Test and 
Validation Sample  
 
The total sample consists of all U.S. firms that have data on Compustat for the time 
period from 1983 to 2006. The validation sample is constructed by randomly selecting 
20% of the firms from the total sample, and the test sample consists of the remaining 
80% of the firms in the total sample.  Panel A of this figure plots the industry distribution 
of the test and validation sample and Panel B reports the year distribution in the test and 
validation sample. 
 










Table 1: Expectations Management - Sample Selection and Statistics  
The sample consists of non-financial and non-regulated U.S. firms for the time period 
from 1988 to 2005. Analyst forecasts and the corresponding actual EPS data are obtained 
from IBES History U.S. Edition tape (Actual File) through WRDS. Stock price data are 
obtained from CRSP and accounting data are obtained from Compustat databases through 
WRDS. 
 # of firms # of firm-years 
Construct expectation management measure 
Obtain forecast and actual EPS from IBES 14,335 88,600 
Match to CRSP to obtain permco and SIC code 11,414 71,497 
Match to Compustat to obtain gvkey 10,707 67,669 
Delete firms in regulated and financial industries   6,992 46,043 
Firm-years with valid measure for early consensus   
Firm-years with valid measure for late consensus      
Firm-years with both valid early and late consensus 
6,336     
6,397   
5,575 
38,173      
35,643     
30,319  
Obtain returns data to estimate Revit = b0 + b1CRETit + vit  to 
compute adjusted revision 5,570 30,303 
Eliminate firms without lagged abnormal earnings  5,535 30,223 
Create validation sample (20% of total firm-years)         3,145       6,044 
Create test sample (the remaining 80% firm-years)         5,272               24,179 
                                                                                                                     
Construct intrinsic value measure (using the test sample) 
Obtain book value and number of shares outstanding 5,114 23,212 
Obtain price data 5,112 23,208 
Require firm-years to have lagged book value (1−itb ) 5,062 23,046 
Require firm-years to have twice lagged book value 
(needed to compute lagged abnormal earnings aitx 1− ) 4,834 22,190 
Sample for cross-sectional analysis 4,834 22,190 
Require firm-years to have bi-monthly analyst forecasts 
           
3,436 
                 
13,792 
Sample for time-series analysis and returns analysis 3,436 13,792 
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Table 2: Validation Check: Expectations Management Measure 
 
This table reports the results of validating the expectations management measure. 
Observations are 644 firm-years in the validation sample with management forecast data 
in the First Call’s CIG dataset. Panel A of the table compares the classification of 
manipulators and non-manipulators in the proposed approach and the other two existing 
approaches. Panel B of the table reports the performances of the alternative classification 
approaches to detect management forecast guidance. 
 
 
Panel A: Classification of Expectations Manipulators and Non-manipulators 
Classification  
Approach Manipulators Non-manipulators Total firm-years 
Tian 161 
(25%) 


















Panel B: Performances of the Three Alternative Approaches to Capture Direct Evidence 
of Management Forecast Guidance 
Approach Tian Bartov et al. Matsumoto 




Total Down up/ 
neutral 
total down up/ 
neutral 
total 
98 385 483 95 369 464 68 310 378 Non- 
Manipulator 20% 80%  20% 80%  18% 82%  
75 86 161 78 102 180 105 161 266 Manipulator 
47% 53%  43% 57%  39% 61%  



























Table 3: Expectations management: Cross-sectional Sample Correlations between Stock 
Prices and Intrinsic Value Estimates  
 
This table reports, for each manipulation group, the annual cross-sectional sample 
correlations between prices and intrinsic value metrics at the beginning and end of the 
year and the change in sample correlations from the beginning to the end of the year. 
Also reported is the difference in sample correlation changes between the manipulator 
and non-manipulator groups. The last row of the table, labelled “All years”, reports the 
time-series sample means of the annual statistics across all years. The t-statistics are 
based on the time-series standard errors of the annual statistics. Intrinsic value metrics are 
estimated using two alternative risk premium of 3% and 8%. Panel A reports results for 
intrinsic value metrics estimated using 3% risk premium and Panel B reports results for 
intrinsic value metrics estimated using 8% risk premium. 
 
 
Panel A: Sample Correlation Statistics for Price and Intrinsic Value Metrics Estimated 
using 3% Risk Premium. 





















1988 0.69 0.75 0.07 0.63 0.68 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.02 
1989 0.74 0.61 -0.14 0.67 0.64 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 -0.11 
1990 0.50 0.43 -0.07 0.63 0.59 -0.05 -0.14 -0.16 -0.02 
1991 0.43 0.42 -0.01 0.58 0.58 0.00 -0.14 -0.15 -0.01 
1992 0.70 0.65 -0.05 0.64 0.65 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.06 
1993 0.64 0.57 -0.07 0.65 0.61 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 
1994 0.57 0.59 0.02 0.64 0.64 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 0.03 
1995 0.49 0.37 -0.13 0.64 0.60 -0.04 -0.15 -0.24 -0.09 
1996 0.57 0.64 0.07 0.53 0.55 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.05 
1997 0.65 0.56 -0.09 0.60 0.57 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.06 
1998 0.58 0.24 -0.34 0.53 0.42 -0.10 0.06 -0.18 -0.24 
1999 0.19 -0.08 -0.27 0.39 0.27 -0.12 -0.20 -0.34 -0.15 
2000 0.28 0.22 -0.06 0.20 0.30 0.10 0.08 -0.08 -0.16 
2001 0.36 0.50 0.15 0.34 0.47 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.03 
2002 0.56 0.54 -0.02 0.56 0.53 -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 
2003 0.62 0.53 -0.08 0.52 0.58 0.05 0.09 -0.04 -0.13 
2004 0.65 0.65 0.00 0.61 0.66 0.05 0.04 0.00 -0.05 























Panel B: Sample Correlation Statistics for Price and Intrinsic Value Metrics Estimated 
using 8% Risk Premium. 





















1988 0.68 0.75 0.07 0.64 0.68 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.03 
1989 0.75 0.61 -0.13 0.66 0.64 -0.02 0.09 -0.05 -0.11 
1990 0.50 0.41 -0.08 0.63 0.58 -0.05 -0.14 -0.20 -0.03 
1991 0.43 0.42 -0.01 0.57 0.57 0.00 -0.14 -0.15 -0.01 
1992 0.72 0.66 -0.05 0.64 0.65 0.01 0.08 0.01 -0.06 
1993 0.64 0.57 -0.07 0.65 0.61 -0.04 -0.01 -0.08 -0.03 
1994 0.61 0.59 -0.01 0.64 0.64 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 
1995 0.49 0.37 -0.13 0.64 0.60 -0.04 -0.15 -0.27 -0.09 
1996 0.57 0.65 0.07 0.53 0.55 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.05 
1997 0.65 0.56 -0.09 0.60 0.57 -0.03 0.05 -0.04 -0.06 
1998 0.59 0.25 -0.34 0.53 0.42 -0.10 0.06 -0.28 -0.24 
1999 0.19 -0.07 -0.27 0.39 0.26 -0.13 -0.20 -0.47 -0.14 
2000 0.28 0.22 -0.06 0.20 0.30 0.10 0.08 0.03 -0.16 
2001 0.36 0.50 0.15 0.34 0.47 0.12 0.01 0.16 0.03 
2002 0.56 0.54 -0.02 0.57 0.53 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.02 
2003 0.62 0.53 -0.08 0.52 0.58 0.05 0.09 0.01 -0.14 
2004 0.65 0.65 0.00 0.61 0.66 0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.04 



















Table 4: Time-series Properties of V/P Ratios for the Manipulators and Non-manipulators 
 
In each year, I compute bi-monthly V/P ratios for each manipulation group at the end of 
each two months. To examine the time-series properties of the bi-monthly V/P ratios 
throughout the year, I compute the sample standard eviations and the first-order 
autocorrelation coefficients of the bi-monthly aggre ated V/P ratios for each 
manipulation group. I then take the means of these statistics across the 18 years (1988 to 
2005) for each manipulation group and report these y arly and across-year average 
statistics for the two manipulation group in Panel A and B respectively. In Panel C of this 
table I report the difference in the standard deviations (Std Dev)  and the first-order 
autoregressive coefficients (AR1)  for the manipulators and non-manipulators in each 
year. The last row of Panel C summarizes the across-year differences in these statistics. 
The t-statistics are based on the time-series standard error from the annual statistics.  
 
Panel A: Yearly V/P Ratio Statistics: Manipulator 
Fiscal 







1988 0.62 0.68 0.67 0.69 0.66 0.61 0.65 0.03 0.02 
1989 0.60 0.63 0.58 0.57 0.55 0.55 0.58 0.03 0.45 
1990 0.59 0.63 0.68 0.78 0.74 0.69 0.69 0.07 0.43 
1991 0.51 0.52 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.41 0.49 0.04 0.31 
1992 0.64 0.69 0.74 0.76 0.70 0.68 0.70 0.04 0.28 
1993 0.56 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.48 0.52 0.03 0.27 
1994 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.56 0.57 0.55 0.57 0.02 0.29 
1995 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.43 0.03 0.47 
1996 0.44 0.43 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.02 0.25 
1997 0.46 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.02 0.12 
1998 0.36 0.38 0.42 0.47 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.04 0.42 
1999 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.23 0.19 0.26 0.04 0.44 
2000 0.42 0.49 0.53 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.53 0.06 0.46 
2001 0.39 0.39 0.43 0.50 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.04 0.39 
2002 0.43 0.47 0.55 0.64 0.58 0.59 0.54 0.08 0.45 
2003 0.50 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.40 0.38 0.44 0.05 0.42 
2004 0.44 0.46 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.03 0.23 
2005 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.01 0.05 
All 
Years 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.53 0.51 0.49 0.50 0.04 0.32 
 
 87 
Panel B: Yearly V/P Ratio Statistics: Non-manipulator 
Fiscal 







1988 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.49 0.50 0.02 0.03 
1989 0.52 0.53 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.01 0.21 
1990 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.57 0.57 0.54 0.53 0.03 0.46 
1991 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.01 0.07 
1992 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.01 0.05 
1993 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.01 0.35 
1994 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.01 0.05 
1995 0.43 0.42 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.01 0.36 
1996 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.01 0.32 
1997 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.01 0.18 
1998 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.02 0.43 
1999 0.35 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.01 0.10 
2000 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.26 0.02 0.50 
2001 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.39 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.03 0.28 
2002 0.36 0.37 0.42 0.45 0.43 0.45 0.41 0.04 0.42 
2003 0.44 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.40 0.03 0.41 
2004 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.01 0.37 
2005 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.01 0.03 
All 
Years 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.02 0.26 
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Panel C: Standard Deviations and First-order Autoregressive Coefficients – Manipulators vs. 
Non-manipulators 



















1988 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.01 
1989 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.45 0.21 0.24 
1990 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.43 0.46 -0.03 
1991 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.31 0.07 0.24 
1992 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.28 0.05 0.23 
1993 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.27 0.35 -0.08 
1994 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.05 0.24 
1995 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.47 0.36 0.11 
1996 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.25 0.32 -0.07 
1997 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.12 0.18 -0.06 
1998 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.42 0.43 -0.01 
1999 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.44 0.1 0.34 
2000 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.46 0.5 -0.04 
2001 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.39 0.28 0.11 
2002 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.45 0.42 0.03 
2003 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.42 0.41 0.01 
2004 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.23 0.37 -0.14 
2005 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.02 
All 
Years 0.04 0.02 
0.02 





Table 5: Returns Predictability Analysis 
 
To ensure that the sample firm-years are aligned in calendar time, I use firms that report 
in February as the sample for the returns test. For each manipulation group in each year, 
observations are ranked and assigned to quintiles based on V/P ratios. Equally-weighted 
buy-hold stock returns are accumulated for each quintile portfolio for the 12 months 
subsequent to the classification of expectations manipulation. The hedge portfolio return 
is then calculated as the difference between the returns for the top and bottom quintiles. I 
report these yearly returns results and across-year average returns for the manipulator and 
non-manipulator groups in Panel A and B of this table respectively. The t-statistic is 
computed from the standard errors of the annual statistics. In Panel C, I report the 
differences in portfolio returns between the manipulator and non-manipulator groups. 
The t-statistic is computed from the standard errors of the annual statistics. 
 
 




Ret_Q1 Ret_Q2 Ret_Q3 Ret_Q4 Ret_Q5 Portfolio Return  
(Ret_Q5-Ret_Q1) 
1989 0.35 0.18 0.05 -0.05 -0.21 -0.56 
1990 0.15 -0.05 0.24 -0.16 -0.05 -0.21 
1991 0.41 0.37 0.27 0.81 0.43 0.02 
1992 0.10 0.40 -0.08 0.13 0.17 0.08 
1993 0.10 0.12 0.41 0.24 0.01 -0.09 
1994 -0.13 -0.06 -0.21 -0.19 -0.15 -0.02 
1995 0.17 0.41 0.68 -0.22 0.03 -0.14 
1996 0.13 0.11 0.31 0.20 0.27 0.14 
1997 0.23 0.09 0.17 -0.12 -0.03 -0.26 
1998 0.83 0.04 -0.27 0.03 0.00 -0.83 
1999 0.31 -0.16 0.02 0.09 0.28 -0.03 
2000 -0.18 -0.09 0.37 0.12 -0.11 0.07 
2001 0.05 0.35 0.50 -0.05 0.13 0.08 
2002 -0.03 -0.30 -0.09 -0.16 -0.29 -0.26 
2003 0.57 0.51 0.60 1.02 1.17 0.60 
2004 0.07 0.23 0.24 0.16 0.21 0.15 
2005 0.09 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.04 
All 









Ret_Q1 Ret_Q2 Ret_Q3 Ret_Q4 Ret_Q5 Portfolio Return  
(Ret_Q5-Ret_Q1) 
1989 0.18 0.08 0.11 0.05 -0.05 -0.23 
1990 0.10 0.15 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.07 
1991 0.27 0.29 0.46 0.38 0.51 0.24 
1992 -0.18 0.20 0.23 0.06 0.31 0.49 
1993 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.27 0.25 0.09 
1994 -0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.11 
1995 0.39 0.24 0.29 0.23 0.21 -0.18 
1996 0.13 0.34 0.40 0.35 0.35 0.22 
1997 0.07 0.23 0.10 0.05 0.16 0.09 
1998 0.49 -0.02 -0.24 -0.09 -0.10 -0.59 
1999 0.42 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.31 -0.12 
2000 0.20 0.46 0.33 0.40 0.24 0.04 
2001 -0.14 0.11 0.08 -0.07 0.27 0.42 
2002 -0.25 -0.20 -0.14 -0.19 -0.05 0.20 
2003 0.49 0.51 0.47 0.64 1.01 0.52 
2004 -0.04 0.12 0.17 0.28 0.13 0.17 
2005 0.12 0.40 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.09 
All 





Panel C: Hedged Portfolio Returns – Manipulator vs. Non-manipulator 




Portfolio Return:  
M-N 
1989 -0.56 -0.23 -0.79 
1990 -0.21 -0.07 -0.14 
1991 0.02 0.24 -0.22 
1992 0.08 0.49 -0.41 
1993 -0.09 0.09 -0.18 
1994 -0.02 0.11 -0.13 
1995 -0.14 -0.18 0.04 
1996 0.14 0.22 -0.08 
1997 -0.26 0.09 -0.35 
1998 -0.83 -0.59 -0.24 
1999 -0.03 -0.12 0.09 
2000 0.07 0.04 0.03 
2001 0.08 0.42 -0.34 
2002 -0.26 0.20 -0.46 
2003 0.60 0.52 0.08 
2004 0.15 0.17 -0.02 










Table 6: V/P Ratio Portfolio Strategy Abnormal Returns after Controlling for Fama and 
French Risk Factors 
 
The sample consists of 1,478 firms and 4,307 firm-years that report earnings in February. 
I rank firms by V/P ratio and assign them into quintiles. I then compute average monthly 
quintile returns and regress the monthly returns of the top and bottom V/P quintiles on 


















































,Re εββββα +++++=  
 





Non-manipulator (N) Manipulator (M) 









































































Table 7: Classification of Repetitive Manipulators and Non-manipulators 
  
A firm-year is defined to be repetitive manipulators (MM) if it is classified as 
manipulators in both the current year and the previous year. It is defined to be non-
repetitive manipulator (MN) if it is classified as  manipulator in current year and non-
manipulator in the previous year. This table reports the sample statistics of current y ar 





 Current year 
 Manipulator Non-manipulator Total 
Manipulator 1,418 
(21.9%) (28.9%) 
















































Table 8: Cross-sectional Analysis: Repetitive vs. Non-repetitive Manipulators 
  
This table reports the yearly correlation statistics for the repetitive and non-repetitive 
manipulators. Repetitive manipulators (MM) are defined to be the firm-years that are 
classified as manipulators in both the current year and the prior year. Non-repetitive 
manipulators (MN) are defined as the firm-years that are classified as manipulators in 
current year and non-manipulator in the previous year. 
 

























1989 0.78 0.69 0.09 0.74 0.57 0.17 0.04 0.12 -0.08 
1990 0.58 0.66 -0.08 0.51 0.37 0.14 0.07 0.29 -0.22 
1991 0.34 0.30 0.04 0.45 0.46 -0.01 -0.11 -0.16 0.05 
1992 0.61 0.45 0.16 0.77 0.76 0.01 -0.16 -0.31 0.15 
1993 0.55 0.54 0.01 0.69 0.64 0.05 -0.13 -0.10 -0.04 
1994 0.65 0.63 0.03 0.63 0.61 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
1995 0.52 0.32 0.20 0.46 0.35 0.11 0.05 -0.03 0.09 
1996 0.49 0.55 -0.06 0.63 0.70 -0.07 -0.14 -0.15 0.01 
1997 0.75 0.66 0.10 0.61 0.57 0.04 0.14 0.08 0.06 
1998 0.45 0.11 0.34 0.61 0.35 0.26 -0.16 -0.25 0.09 
1999 0.07 -0.10 0.17 0.29 -0.10 0.39 -0.22 0.00 -0.23 
2000 0.29 0.37 -0.08 0.33 0.31 0.02 -0.04 0.06 -0.10 
2001 0.44 0.47 -0.03 0.36 0.48 -0.12 0.08 -0.02 0.10 
2002 0.57 0.69 -0.12 0.56 0.49 0.07 0.00 0.20 -0.19 
2003 0.69 0.57 0.12 0.61 0.61 0.00 0.08 -0.04 0.12 
2004 0.69 0.66 0.03 0.59 0.66 -0.07 0.10 0.00 0.10 
2005 0.59 0.44 0.16 0.65 0.70 -0.04 -0.06 -0.26 0.20 
All 
years 0.53 0.47 
0.06 











Table 9: Time-series Analysis: Repetitive vs. Non-repetitive Manipulators 
  
Repetitive manipulators (MM) are as the firm-years that are classified as manipulators in 
both the current year and the previous year. Non-repetitive manipulators (MN) are 
defined as the firm-years that are classified as manipulators in current year and non-
manipulator in the previous year. This table reports the V/P ratios, the standard deviation 
and the first-order autocorrelation coefficients (AR1) of the bi-monthly aggregated V/P 
ratios for MM and MN. Panel A and B report the yearly statistics for repetitive 
manipulators and non-repetitive manipulators respectiv ly. I then take the mean of these 
bi-monthly V/P ratios and their standard deviations a d autocorrelation coefficients in the 
AR1 processes across the 18 years (1988 to 2005) for each manipulation group and report 
these summary statistics in the last row of each panel. In Panel C of this table, I report the 
difference in standard deviation and AR1s for the manipulators and non-manipulators. 
The t-statistics are based on the time-series standard error of the annual statistics. 
 
Panel A: V/P Ratio Statistics for the Repetitive Manipulator (MM) 
Fiscal 







1989 0.65 0.69 0.63 0.60 0.58 0.60 0.62 0.04 0.51 
1990 0.59 0.63 0.67 0.79 0.72 0.65 0.68 0.07 0.32 
1991 0.66 0.68 0.69 0.67 0.64 0.54 0.65 0.06 0.25 
1992 0.57 0.63 0.67 0.72 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.05 0.28 
1993 0.60 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.51 0.57 0.03 0.13 
1994 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.64 0.66 0.62 0.64 0.02 0.32 
1995 0.63 0.61 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.59 0.02 0.30 
1996 0.48 0.48 0.53 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.02 0.20 
1997 0.59 0.58 0.52 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.56 0.02 0.08 
1998 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.48 0.43 0.36 0.41 0.05 0.13 
1999 0.26 0.30 0.31 0.29 0.25 0.22 0.27 0.03 0.38 
2000 0.47 0.55 0.58 0.59 0.66 0.65 0.58 0.07 0.39 
2001 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.62 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.04 0.02 
2002 0.52 0.56 0.64 0.75 0.67 0.70 0.64 0.09 0.39 
2003 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.56 0.52 0.49 0.56 0.05 0.43 
2004 0.48 0.50 0.56 0.55 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.03 0.24 
2005 0.41 0.39 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.39 0.42 0.02 0.07 
All 
Years 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.55 0.04 0.26 
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Panel B: V/P Ratio Statistics for Non-repetitive Manipulator 
Fiscal 







1989 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.01 0.41 
1990 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.53 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.02 0.46 
1991 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.45 0.48 0.01 0.07 
1992 0.46 0.48 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.01 0.20 
1993 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.01 0.38 
1994 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.01 0.18 
1995 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.40 0.01 0.29 
1996 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.01 0.17 
1997 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.01 0.12 
1998 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.02 0.45 
1999 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.01 0.29 
2000 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.30 0.01 0.55 
2001 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.36 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.03 0.28 
2002 0.33 0.34 0.39 0.42 0.40 0.42 0.38 0.04 0.44 
2003 0.43 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.35 0.39 0.03 0.41 
2004 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.01 0.34 
2005 0.33 0.32 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.01 0.12 
All 




Panel C: Standard Deviations and AR1s – Repetitive Manipulators vs. Non-repetitive 
Manipulators 
 Std Dev (V/P2~V/P12) AR1 (V/P2~V/P12) 
Fiscal 
Year 
MM  MN  MM-MN 
 
MM  MN  MM-MN 
 
1989 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.51 0.41 0.1 
1990 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.32 0.46 -0.14 
1991 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.25 0.07 0.18 
1992 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.28 0.2 0.08 
1993 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.38 -0.25 
1994 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.32 0.18 0.14 
1995 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.3 0.29 0.01 
1996 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.2 0.17 0.03 
1997 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.12 -0.04 
1998 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.13 0.45 -0.32 
1999 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.38 0.29 0.09 
2000 0.07 0.01 0.06 0.39 0.55 -0.16 
2001 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.28 -0.26 
2002 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.39 0.44 -0.05 
2003 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.43 0.41 0.02 
2004 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.24 0.34 -0.1 
2005 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.12 -0.05 
All Years 0.04 0.02 
0.02 





Table 10: Returns Analysis: Repetitive vs. Non-repetitiv  Manipulators 
  
Repetitive manipulators (MM) are defined as the firm-years that are classified as 
manipulators in both the current year and the previous year. Non-repetitive manipulators 
(MN) are defined as the firm-years that are classified as manipulators in current year and 
non-manipulator in the previous year. For each manipulation group in each year, 
observations are ranked and assigned to quintiles based on V/P ratios. Equally-weighted 
buy-hold stock returns are accumulated for each quintile portfolio for the 12 months 
subsequent to the classification of expectations manipulation. The hedge portfolio return 
is then calculated as the difference between the returns for the top and bottom V/P 
quintiles. I report these yearly results for the manipulator and non-manipulator groups in 
Panel A and B of this table. I then take the means of these annual portfolio returns across 
the 18 sample years for each manipulation group and report the cross-year mean returns 
in the last row of these two Panels. In Panel C I repo t the differences in portfolio returns 
between the repetitive and non-repetitive manipulator groups. The t-statistic is computed 
from the standard errors of the annual statistics. 
 
 
Panel A: Quintile and Hedged Portfolio Returns—Repetitiv  Manipulators 
Fiscal 
Year 
Ret_Q1 Ret_Q2 Ret_Q3 Ret_Q4 Ret_Q5 Portfolio Return 
(Ret_Q5-Ret_Q1) 
1990 0.11 -0.34 0.31 -0.28 -0.03 -0.14 
1991 0.49 0.19 0.89 0.06 0.31 -0.18 
1992 1.14 0.19 -0.26 0.21 0.08 -1.06 
1993 0.58 -0.20 0.40 0.41 -0.19 -0.77 
1994 -0.39 0.03 -0.11 -0.22 -0.22 0.18 
1995 0.53 0.48 -0.10 -0.07 -0.16 -0.70 
1996 0.49 0.16 0.23 0.25 0.06 -0.43 
1997 0.12 0.51 0.10 -0.07 0.33 0.21 
1998 0.73 -0.17 -0.29 -0.41 0.23 -0.50 
1999 -0.26 -0.11 -0.43 -0.28 0.32 0.59 
2000 -0.53 0.44 0.00 -0.09 -0.40 0.13 
2001 0.03 -0.10 0.12 0.60 0.89 0.86 
2002 -0.17 -0.38 0.07 -0.18 -0.59 -0.42 
2003 0.37 0.42 0.54 0.49 1.05 0.68 
2004 0.11 0.66 0.27 0.29 0.44 0.33 
2005 0.02 0.25 0.07 0.24 0.14 0.12 
All 
Years 0.21 0.13 0.11 0.06 0.14 -0.07 
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Panel B: Quintile and Hedged Portfolio Returns—Non-repetitive Manipulators 
Fiscal 
Year 
Ret_Q1 Ret_Q2 Ret_Q3 Ret_Q4 Ret_Q5 Portfolio Return 
(Ret_Q5-Ret_Q1) 
1990 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.04 -0.06 
1991 0.00 0.13 -0.04 -0.02 0.10 0.10 
1992 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.05 
1993 0.04 0.08 0.10 -0.07 0.09 0.06 
1994 0.13 0.15 0.06 0.08 0.03 -0.10 
1995 0.15 0.10 -0.16 -0.11 0.18 0.03 
1996 0.22 0.13 0.10 0.18 0.15 -0.07 
1997 0.17 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.07 -0.11 
1998 0.09 0.16 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.07 
1999 0.14 0.09 0.07 0.16 0.23 0.09 
2000 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.30 0.33 
2001 0.07 0.19 0.23 0.12 0.17 0.10 
2002 0.21 0.12 0.26 0.31 0.26 0.05 
2003 0.44 0.32 -0.04 0.92 0.31 -0.13 
2004 0.21 0.48 0.22 0.32 0.13 -0.08 
2005 -0.01 0.21 0.05 0.05 0.23 0.24 
All 













1990 -0.14 -0.06 -0.08 
1991 -0.18 0.10 -0.28 
1992 -1.06 0.05 -1.11 
1993 -0.77 0.06 -0.83 
1994 0.18 -0.10 0.28 
1995 -0.70 0.03 -0.73 
1996 -0.43 -0.07 -0.36 
1997 0.21 -0.11 0.32 
1998 -0.50 -0.07 -0.43 
1999 0.59 0.09 0.5 
2000 0.13 0.33 -0.2 
2001 0.86 0.10 0.76 
2002 -0.42 0.05 -0.47 
2003 0.68 -0.13 0.81 
2004 0.33 -0.08 0.41 
2005 0.12 0.24 -0.12 
All 





Table 11: Earnings Management Sample Statistics – the Test and Validation Samples 
 
The population consists of all U.S. firms with data on Compustat for the time period from 
1983 to 2006. From this population, I randomly select 20% of the total firms and use 
them as the validation sample to develop and validate my earnings management measure. 
I then use the remaining 80% as the test sample to conduct the main analysis and examine 
the impact of earnings management on firm valuation. This table reports the number of 
industries, industry-years, firms and firm-years in the test and validation samples.  
 
 
Number of observations Industries Industry-years Firms Firm-years 
Validation sample 69 1,587 5,206 97,283 
Test sample 74 1,693 20,823 391,626 




Table 12: Sample Statistics – Estimation of the FLMJ odel in the Validation Sample 
 
This table reports the sample statistics (number of industries, industry-years and firm-
years) at each step in estimating the FLMJ model in the validation sample.  
 
Steps Industries Industry-years Firm-years 
Raw data (validation sample) 69 1,587 97,283 
Sufficient data for each variable used in the 









Exclude financial and regulated industries 48 784 15,073 
Exclude industry-years with less     
than 10 firm-year observations  
30 401 13,458 
Final sample with valid discretionary accrual 
estimates 
30 401 13,458 
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Table 13: Estimation of the FLMJ and Other Jones-type Models  
This table reports the estimation of the FLMJ model and the other Jones-type models in 
the validation sample. In Panel A, I report and compare the estimated coefficients and 
adjusted R-squares from the FLMJ model estimates in my study and in Dechow et al. 




Panel A: Estimation of the FLMJ model 
 Dechow et al. (2003) My study 
Sample period 1988-2000 1988-2006 
 





















Adj. 2R  0.200 0.253 
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Panel B: Specification and Estimation of Four Alternative Jones-type Models 
 
Lagged Modified Jones Model:   
tititititiit AccrualGPPEARsales =Accrual ,1,3,2,,1 )( εβββα +++∆−∆+ −  
Lagged Modified Jones Model:  
tititititiit AccrualGPPEARsales =Accrual ,1,3,2,,1 )( εβββα +++∆−∆+ −  
FLMJ model without sales growth (FLMJ w/o SG): 
tititititiit AccrualGPPEARsalesk =Accrual ,1,3,2,,1 ))1(( εβββα +++∆−∆++ −  
FLMJ model:  
tittititititiit SaleGRAccrualGPPEARsalesk =Accrual ,)1~,(41,3,2,,1 _))1(( εββββα ++++∆−∆++ +−
 
Models Industry-
year obs. α  β1 β2 β3 β4  Adj.
2R  








   
0.114 










































Table 14: Distribution of GAAP Violators in the DA Deciles 
 
The table reports the distribution of GAAP violators in the discretionary accrual deciles, 
where the discretionary accruals are estimated using the Forward-Looking Modified 
Jones model and the GAAP violators are obtained from Erickson et al. (2004) for the 




1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total 
1    1   2 1 1 1 6 
2        1 2  3 
3     1  1 1   3 
4      1  1   2 
5    1    1   2 
6   1  2   1   4 
7 1     1   2 1 5 
8  1    1  1   3 
9      1 1  1  3 
10    1   1  1  3 
Total 1 1 1 3 3 4 5 7 7 2 34 
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Table 15: Validation of the Earnings Management Measure 
 
This table reports the DTE and Special Items for loss-avoidance accrual manipulators and 
non-manipulators. Also reported are the differences in DTE and special items between 
the two manipulation groups.  
 
 








(t = 2.574) 
0.0286 
(t = 10.89) 
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Table 16: Estimation of the Intrinsic Value Metrics n the Test Sample 
 
The sample used to construct the intrinsic value metrics consists of 391,626 firm-years 
from the test sample. I use the FLMJ model to estimate discretionary accruals and report 
the sample statistics in Panel A; I use Ohlson (1995) as the valuation framework to 
estimate the intrinsic value metrics and report this estimation in Panel B. Panel C merges 
the two samples and constructs loss-avoidance accrul manipulators and non-
manipulators. 
 
Panel A: Construction of Intrinsic Value Metrics 
 industries industry-years firms firm-years 
Obtain Data 
Test sample 74 1,693 20,823 391,626 
Exclude financial and regulated 
industries (SIC code 4000-5000 and 
6000-6999 and > 8000) 
51 1,124 13,751 252,261 
Match to CRSP  51 1,124 11,018 231,118 
Match to IBES 51 1,124 7,853 179,148 
Obtain book value per share 51 1,104 7,559 92,385 
Obtain earnings data and earnings 
announcement date 
51 1,093 7,419 76,419 
Obtain analyst forecasts data 50 1,068 6,398 49,296 
Construct the Intrinsic Value Measure 
Delete firm-years without lagged 
book value  
50 1,067 6,356 48,828 
Delete firms without lagged 
abnormal earnings  50 1,066 6,338 48,009 
Estimate omega 50 1,021 6,227 46,628 
Estimate gamma  50 930 5,886 42,838 
Firm-years with intrinsic value 
estimates and stock price 50 930 5,845 37,701 
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Panel C: Merge of the Intrinsic Value Measure and DA Measure Sample and 
Classification of Manipulators and Non-manipulators 
 
Steps Industries Industry-years Firms Firm-years 
Raw data (test sample) 74 1,693 20,823 391,626 
Exclude financial and regulated 
industries (SIC code 4000-5000 and 
6000-6999 and > 8000) 
51 1,124 13,751 252,261 
Sufficient data for construct each 
variable in the FLMJ model 
51 856 8,481 60,704 
Exclude industry-years with less     
than 10 firm-year observations 
(required to estimate k for each 
industry-year) 
43 719 8,421 60,110 
Firm-years with valid discretionary 
accrual estimates 
43 719 8,421 60,110 
Steps Industries Industry-years Firms Firm-years 
Discretionary accrual Sample 43 719 8,421 60,110 
Intrinsic value estimates sample 50 930 5,845 37,701 
Merged intrinsic value and discretionary 
accrual samples 
43 719 4,915 29,241 
Construct the manipulator sample (firm-years 
with earnings greater than zero and earnings 
before discretionary accrual less than zero) 
43 652 2,453 4,721 
Construct matched non-manipulator sample 
(matched to the manipulator sample on firm 
size, industry, and year) 
43 652 2,045 4,721 
Sample for V, P, and V/P ratio analysis 43 652 3,170 9,442 
Sample for returns analysis: 





        




Table 17 – Sample Statistics: Earnings Management and Expectations Management 
This table summarizes the yearly sample statistics for the expectations management sample (i.e., firm-years with valid expectations 
management measure), earnings management sample (i.e., firm-years with valid earnings management measure), and the joint sample 
(i.e., firm-years with both earnings management and expectations management measures). 
 
Merged sample  Exp mgmt sample Earn mgmt sample 
Exp Manipulator Earn Manipulate 
Fiscal 
year 




1988 32% 68% 1110 19% 81% 388 9% 91% 32 13% 88% 24 115 
1989 44% 56% 1253 17% 83% 2736 19% 81% 346 48% 52% 138 795 
1990 16% 84% 1361 17% 83% 2929 20% 80% 146 16% 84% 187 919 
1991 38% 62% 1385 18% 82% 2976 19% 81% 380 41% 59% 182 966 
1992 15% 85% 1432 22% 78% 3021 21% 79% 145 14% 86% 217 993 
1993 26% 74% 1690 17% 83% 3211 18% 82% 305 29% 71% 193 1155 
1994 14% 86% 1884 17% 83% 3424 22% 78% 174 19% 81% 204 1277 
1995 39% 61% 2013 16% 84% 3540 17% 83% 528 42% 58% 210 1362 
1996 24% 76% 2169 16% 84% 3755 15% 85% 350 22% 78% 228 1437 
1997 18% 82% 2374 16% 84% 4169 17% 83% 285 19% 81% 259 1598 
1998 29% 71% 2279 15% 85% 4163 16% 84% 463 32% 68% 240 1566 
1999 22% 78% 1958 14% 86% 3994 12% 88% 286 17% 83% 208 1357 
2000 22% 78% 1942 14% 86% 4031 16% 84% 296 25% 75% 184 1358 
2001 33% 67% 1727 13% 87% 3869 15% 85% 411 35% 65% 173 1233 
2002 10% 90% 1611 19% 81% 3693 23% 77% 124 12% 88% 250 1130 
2003 40% 60% 1661 18% 82% 3500 23% 77% 459 45% 55% 235 1151 
2004 20% 80% 1789 14% 86% 3416 21% 79% 229 26% 74% 192 1258 








30241 16% 84% 
 
60110 18% 82% 
5176 




Table 18: V, P and V/P ratio Comparison for M and N 
 
The loss-avoidance manipulator group is constructed by selecting firm-years with 
earnings greater than zero and earnings after discretionary accrual less than zero. The 
non-manipulator control sample is constructed by matching each firm-year in the 
manipulator sample with a firm-year in the non-manipulator sample on firm size (as 
measured by lagged total assets), industry (2-digit SIC code) and year. Using the 4,721 
firm-years in the loss-avoidance manipulator sample and 4,721 firm-years in the non-
manipulator sample, I compute the average price, intrinsic value estimate, and V/P ratio 
for each manipulation group and the differences in these statistics between the two 
groups across all years; I report these summary statistics here. 
 
 Manipulator (M) Non-manipulator 
(N) 



























Table 19: V/P Ratio Portfolio Strategy Abnormal Returns after Controlling for Fama and 
French Risk Factors 
 
The sample consists of 1,299 firms and 3,014 firm-years that report earnings in February. 
For each manipulation group in each year, I rank firms by V/P ratio and assign them into 
quintiles. I then compute average monthly quintile returns and regress the monthly 
returns of the top and bottom V/P quintiles on the thr e Fama and French risk factors and 
the momentum factor in the following regressions: 
 
Retm,t
Q5 _M = αm,t




Q1_M + β1MktRFm,t + β2SMBm,t + β3HMLm,t + β4UMDm,t + εm,t
Q1_M
Retm,t
Q5 _N = αm,t




Q1_N + β1MktRFm,t + β2SMBm,t + β3HMLm,t + β4UMDm,t + εm,t
Q1_N  
 






Non-manipulator (N) Manipulator (M) 
Dep.  Var. Ret_Q5 Ret_Q1 
 
Ret 







(Q5 - Q1) 
Intercept 0.009 
(t=2.78) 
0.005 
(t=1.34) 
0.004 
(t=3.17) 
0.004 
(t=1.24) 
0.003 
(t=1.02) 
0.001 
(t=0.74) 
mktrf 0.925 
(t=10.26) 
0.985 
(t=9.07) 
-0.059 
(t=-1.79) 
1.105 
(t=12.80) 
1.021 
(t=12.15) 
0.083 
(t=2.94) 
smb 0.755 
(t=7.82) 
1.002 
(t=8.61) 
-0.246 
(t=-6.92) 
0.909 
(t=9.84) 
0.953 
(t=10.59) 
-0.044 
(t=-1.44) 
hml 0.554 
(t=4.65) 
-0.320 
(t=-2.23) 
0.875 
(t=19.91) 
0.802 
(t=7.03) 
-0.139 
(t=-1.26) 
0.941 
(t=25.11) 
umd -0.191 
(t=-2.78) 
-0.245 
(t=-2.97) 
0.054 
(t=2.14) 
-0.367 
(t=-5.58) 
-0.071 
(t=-1.11) 
-0.295 
(t=-13.66) 
 
 
 
 
